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DIRECT ACTIONS FOR EMOTIONAL HARM:
IS COMPROMISE POSSIBLE?
Julie A. Davies*
Abstract! While most courts and commentators acknowledge that emotional injury
resulting from negligence may merit compensation, they share the conviction that some
limits must be placed on such claims. They identify two basic policy rationales as the
justifications for limiting claims for emotional harm: (1) the desire to ensure that a defend-
ant's liability for negligence is not disproportionate to his or her fault, and (2) the desire to
prevent litigation of trivial or fraudulent claims.
This Article argues that the two rules most frequently applied by courts to effectuate
limitations on recovery-the "zone-of-danger" rule and the "foreseeability-plus-serious-
injury" rule-suffer from serious deficiencies. The Article considers an approach sug-
gested by the California Supreme Court's decision in Marlene F. v. Affiliated Psychiatric
Medical Clinic, Inc. There, the court utilized many of the same rules applicable in tort
actions for personal injury and property damage, concluding that these rules struck an
acceptable and logical balance between the conflicting goals of limitation and compensa-
tion. The Article evaluates the ramifications of such an approach and concludes that the
duty rules identified by the court would provide a fair and workable framework for deter-
mining the class of plaintiffs permitted to sue for negligently inflicted emotional harm.
The Article cautions, however, that even if the duty rules discussed are utilized, courts will
continue to confront difficult policy questions in some types of cases.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Judges and lawyers have long been challenged by the task of select-
ing which of many potential plaintiffs may pursue claims for negligent
infliction of emotional harm.' Although courts and legal scholars
have dealt extensively with the question of whether a plaintiff may
recover for emotional harm suffered as a result of viewing negligently
inflicted injury to a loved one,2 they have devoted far less attention to
a much more commonly occurring issue-the actionability of claims
brought by individuals contending that, as a result of a defendant's
negligence, they have sustained damages arising from emotional
harm This Article focuses specifically on the long-ignored "direct"
1. In this Article, the author uses the terms "harm" and "distress" interchangeably.
2. See infra articles cited at note 95.
3. California refers to these types of actions as "direct" actions to contrast them with the
cause of action that arises when one experiences emotional distress as a result of injury to
another. California utilizes different rules to govern the two types of claims. See infra text
accompanying notes 31-63. Some jurisdictions do not utilize this terminology, but the courts are
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actions for emotional harm, examining the question of whether, and to
what extent, this type of claim should be recognized as a viable basis
for recovery of damages.
Although courts and commentators acknowledge that injury sus-
tained by emotional, rather than physical, impact may merit compen-
sation, the intangible character of emotional harm reinforces a shared
conviction that recovery must be limited.4 Rules adopted to impose
these limits seek to effectuate two basic policy objectives. First, the
rules attempt to ensure that a defendant's liability for negligence will
not extend to anyone and everyone emotionally affected by that negli-
gence; in other words, that liability for negligence will not be "dispro-
portionate to fault."5 The concept of disproportionality is primarily a
fairness concern, although courts clearly contemplate the burdens of
unlimited litigation on themselves and on society as well. The second
primary objective of legal rules imposing limitations on emotional dis-
tress claims is to prevent litigation of trivial and/or fraudulent cases.6
Questions of fairness and resource allocation pervade this goal as well.
Although the policy objectives and their rationales are fairly clear,
the legal rules that courts have adopted to effectuate them do not
always achieve a balance between an injured plaintiff's claim for com-
pensation and the societal and institutional objectives to be served by
limiting claims. To illustrate this point, Section II of this Article
undertakes a brief overview of the legal rules that govern claims for
emotional distress in the majority of jurisdictions.7 Based on this
foundation, Section III evaluates and critiques the operation and pol-
icy of the legal rules that currently dominate the determination of
whether direct actions may proceed.' Under the first of these rules,
the zone-of-danger rule, persons who have been exposed to a threat of
bodily harm and have suffered emotional harm as a result will be
deemed to state a cause of action. Although this standard succeeds in
imposing concrete limitations on the numbers of suits litigated, it is
frequently applied in an extremely narrow fashion and, hence, is inca-
pable of responding to cases in which the plaintiff is not within a con-
crete zone of physical harm.9 Another predominant rule provides that
faced with the same policy issues regarding the scope of permissible recovery. For the sake of
clarity, the author uses the term "direct actions" throughout this Article to refer to claims for
emotional distress that do not stem from the plaintiff's status as a percipient witness.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 89-95.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 71-72.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 64-69.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 19-69.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 70-150.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 97-110.
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in order to state a claim, a plaintiff must allege that harm is foreseeable
and that the injury suffered is serious.1" This rule is imperfect for
quite a different set of reasons. If courts take the rule at face value,
foreseeability of harm provides virtually no limitation on the numbers
and types of suits that will be permitted. If courts do not take the rule
literally, they are left with no idea as to which subset of claims ought
to proceed.11
Despite their shortcomings, these two basic rules have been, and
are, the mainstay of legal analysis pertaining to direct actions. In Cali-
fornia, a jurisdiction that had adopted the foreseeabillty-plus-serious-
injury rule,12 the courts have struggled with the borders between
direct and "bystander" actions a and have attempted to formulate
clearer rules about which individuals would be entitled to sue as
bystanders. 4 These efforts have not included any comprehensive
explanation of the principles that ought to be employed to determine
the actionability of damages for emotional distress in the vast number
of cases in which the claimant is, under the court's own rules, not a
bystander.
In 1989, the California Supreme Court was finally forced to con-
front the confusion surrounding direct actions in Marlene F v. Affili-
ated Psychiatric Medical Clinic, Inc. 15 The court was presented with
the claim of a mother who, along with her son, had consulted a thera-
pist for family counseling. Marlene F. alleged that the therapist
molested her son, and that she suffered emotional distress as a result. 16
10. The author refers to this as the "foreseeability-plus-serious-injury rule."
11. See infra text accompanying notes 113-14.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 38-39.
13. Bystander claims are understood by courts to consist of actions by individuals who have
witnessed harm to another. Some courts preclude any recovery by a bystander unless the
bystander was personally endangered by the defendant's negligence. Other jurisdictions permit a
broader class of individuals to seek recovery. See infra text accompanying notes 55-63. Direct
actions are non-percipient witness claims--claims that do not fit within the parameters of the
legal rules courts have developed. These actions encompass an extremaly broad range of factual
circumstances and may in fact be integrally related to harm sufferzd by a loved one. The
California Supreme Court in Thing v. La Chusa, 48 Cal. 3d 644, 771 P.2d 814, 257 Cal. Rptr.
865 (1989), acknowledges that "the subtleties in the distinction between the right to recover as a
'bystander' and as a 'direct victim' created what one Court of Appeal has described as 'an
amorphous nether realm.'" Thing, 771 P.2d at 823, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 874 (citing Newton v.
Kaiser Found. Hosp., 184 Cal. App. 3d 386, 228 Cal. Rptr. 890, 893 (1986)).
14. Ochoa v. Superior Court, 39 Cal. 3d 159, 703 P.2d 1, 216 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1985); Thing,
771 P.2d 814, 257 Cal. Rptr. 865.
15. 48 Cal. 3d 583, 770 P.2d 278, 257 Cal. Rptr. 98 (1989).
16. Child molestation is clearly the type of conduct one would often associate with an
intentional tort. However, because the law pertaining to intentional infliction of emotional harm
has been narrowly construed, a person in Marlene F.'s position would have to have been present
at the time of the molestation to state a cause of action. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
Vol. 67:1, 1992
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In recognizing the validity of her claim, the court enumerated three
bases for recognition of a legal duty and evinced a desire to reintegrate
direct actions into the fold of ordinary negligence actions.17
The court's short and sparing opinion in Marlene F. raises many
more questions than it answers and may even have increased the con-
fusion surrounding direct actions. Despite this confusion, the Califor-
nia court may also have embarked on a new path-one that has the
potential to ameliorate some of the inadequacies of both the zone-of-
danger and foreseeability-plus-serious-injury rules. Section IV of this
Article examines at length the bases for duty enumerated by the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court in Marlene F. in order to evaluate whether the
court's approach represents a feasible alternative to the existing rules.
The balance of the Article explores the parameters of this compromise
position and evaluates its validity as compared to the prevailing legal
rules and to other scholarly suggestions for reform." The Article's
ultimate conclusion is that the rules pertaining to this type of claim
can be made fairer and more concrete if courts draw on some of the
duty rules that govern cases of physical injury or property damage as a
starting point in their analyses. Many of these rules speak to the exist-
ence of relationships and specific interactions between plaintiffs and
defendants that warrant accountability for damages arising from emo-
tional harm.
II. A PRIMER ON THE EXISTING LEGAL RULES
A review of the development of the law pertaining to recovery of
damages for emotional distress is a necessary prerequisite to any dis-
cussion of the theoretical and practical problems surrounding direct
actions for emotional distress. In general, courts have manifested hos-
tility toward claims for damages for mental distress for as long as
those claims have been presented by litigants.1 9 Their antagonism
toward allowing recovery in tort has been aimed at both intention-
§ 46(2) (1965). Thus, Marlene F.'s right to bring suit hinged on the viability of her negligence
claim. Justice Arguelles wrote a strong concurring opinion in Marlene F. criticizing the rigidity
of the law of intentional torts. See Marlene F., 770 P.2d at 283-88, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 103-08.
17. Marlene F., 770 P.2d at 280-83, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 100-03; see also infra text
accompanying notes 159-74.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 151-244.
19. See, eg., Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 19 Cal. 3d 441, 563 P.2d 858, 862, 138 Cal.
Rptr. 302, 306 (1977); Kramer v. Ricksmeier, 159 Iowa 48, 139 N.W. 1091 (1913); Hixson v.
Slocum, 156 Ky. 487, 161 S.W. 522 (1913); Beaulieu v. Great N. Ry., 103 Minn. 47, 114 N.W.
353 (1907); Grayson v. St. Louis Transit Co., 100 Mo. App. 60, 71 S.W. 730 (1903); Palsgraf v.
Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E.99, 100 (1928); State v. Daniel, 136 N.C. 571, 48
S.E. 544 (1904); Brooker v. Silverthorne, 111 S.C. 553, 99 S.E. 350 (1919).
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ally20 and negligently inflicted mental distress. Numerous policy con-
cerns have been expressed in support of the refusal to recognize a duty
to avoid infliction of mental distress: the impossibilty of measuring
mental disturbance in terms of money,21 lack of "proximate cause,"22
lack of precedent,23 the possibility of allowing recovery for fraudulent
or trivial claims,2 4 significant increases in liability of defendants in
amounts disproportionate to the level of culpability,25 and the inability
of courts to formulate appropriate limits on the availability of claims
due to the nature of the injury involved.2 6
20. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEFTON, D. OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF
ToRma § 54 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON]; see also Pearson, Liability to
Bystanders for Negligently Inflicted Emotional Harm-A Comment on the Nature of Arbitrary
Rules, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 477, 485-86 (1982). Professor Pearson argues that intentional
infliction of emotional distress was recognized not in deference to the interest in mental
tranquility, but primarily as a vehicle for maintaining the peace.
21. The argument is that because the injury suffered is intangible, money is not as useful as a
means of redress as it is in the case of injury to body or property. See, ag., Turpin v. Sortini, 31
Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d 954, 964, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337, 347 (1982) ("a monetary award... cannot in
any meaningful sense compensate the plaintiff"); Borer, 563 P.2d at 860, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 304
(1977) ("loss of consortium is an intangible injury for which money damages do not afford an
accurate measure or suitable recompense"); Howard v. Lecher, 42 N.Y.2d 109, 366 N.E.2d 64,
65, 397 N.Y.S.2d 363, 364 (1977) (recovery "is based on the legal fictior that money damages can
compensate for a victim's injury"). For an argument that tort damages are unable to restore
victims to the status quo before the accident regardless of the type of harm suffered, see Abel, A
Critique of Torts, 37 UCLA L. RaV. 785, 802 (1990).
22. This argument consists of the contention that emotional distres suffered by the plaintiff
as a result of the defendant's actions could not have been anticipated by the defendant as the
"natural and probable consequences of his act." See Braun v. Craven, 174 111. 401, 51 N.E. 657,
659 (1898); Cleveland, C., C. and St. L. Ry. Co. v. Stewart, 24 Ind. App. 374, 56 N.E. 917,
919-21 (1900); Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354, 355 (1896), overruled
by Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961); Chittick v.
Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., 224 Pa. 13, 73 A. 4, 6 (1909) ("consequences... were of such an
extraordinary character").
23. See eg., Lehman v. Brooklyn City Ry. Co., 47 Hun. 355 (N.Y. 1888).
24. This fear stems from the intangibility of the injury suffered. The thought is that
emotional injury is easy to exaggerate or to invent. See, eg., Perry v. Capital Traction Co., 32
F.2d 938, 940 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 280 U.S. 577 (1929); Kalen v. Terre Haute & I.R. Co., 18
Ind. App. 202,47 N.E. 694 (1897); Payton v. Abbott Labs, 386 Mass. 540, 437 N.E.2d 171, 178
(1982); Huston v. Borough of Freemansburg, 212 Pa. 548, 61 A. 1022 (1905).
25. Courts appear to be concerned about the possibility that each negligent act will give rise
to numerous and potentially limitless claims. See, eg., Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co.,
59 Cal. 2d 295, 379 P.2d 513, 525, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33, 45 (1965), overruled on other grounds by
Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968); layton, 437 N.E.2d at 179;
Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497, 501 (1935). For a more complete assessment
of this concern, see infra text accompanying notes 97-109.
26. The task of formulating meaningful rules is particularly difficult because the intangibility
of emotional harm means there are no physical constraints on its occurrence. See, eg., Dillon,
441 P.2d at 927, 69 Cal.Rptr. at 87 (Burke, J., dissenting); Mitchell, 45 N.E. at 355; Tobin v.
Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 249 N.E.2d 419, 423, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 561 (1969); Becker v.
Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 366 N.E.2d 807, 814,413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 900 (1978); Waube, 258 N.W.
at 501.
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Although courts have widely rejected "lack of proximate cause"'2 7
and lack of precedent,28 the other policy concerns continue to influ-
ence judicial decisions. Nonetheless, not every policy concern arises in
every class of case presenting a claim of mental distress. Courts, how-
ever, tend to view the policies supporting limitation of duty as.a pack-
age-rejecting all or accepting all without truly focusing on whether,
or to what extent, particular policies are implicated by various classes
of claims.2 9 The remainder of Section II will familiarize the reader
with the basic rules and their purported justifications. Subsequent sec-
tions will undertake an in-depth evaluation of their validity.3"
A. "'Direct" Actions
Most jurisdictions recognize a cause of action for mental distress for
persons who have suffered some type of "impact,"31 or who were in
the "zone of danger" of bodily harm, but who suffered only mental
27. Se4 eg., Dziokonski v. Babineau, 375 Mass. 555, 380 N.E.2d 1295, 1301 (1978); Sinn v.
Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 404 A.2d 672, 678-79; Waub4 258 N.W. at 501.
28. Se, eg., Dziokonski 380 N.E.2d at 1300; Corso v. Merrill, 119 N.H. 647, 406 A.2d 300,
307 (1979); Sinn, 404 A.2d at 674 (quoting Papieves v. Lawrence, 437 Pa. 373,263 A.2d 118, 120
(1970)); D'Ambra v. United States, 114 R.I. 643, 338 A.2d 524, 526 (1975); see generally
Rodrigues v. State, 52 Haw. 156, 472 P.2d 509, 519 (1970) (rejecting the analytical scheme most
courts have developed for treatment of negligently inflicted emotional distress).
29. In addition to the policy rationales that courts suggest support their decisions, Professors
Chamallas and Kerber argue that gender differentiation has played a large part in the
development of the law pertaining to recovery for emotional distress and that this factor has not
been included in contemporary case books and commentary. Charnallas & Kerber, Women,
Mothers, and the Law of FighL" A History, 88 MICH. L. REv. 814, 819 (1990).
30. Although direct actions for emotional harm are the focus of this Article, the rules
governing bystander claims are also outlined in this subsection. The line between the two types
of actions has been called into question in some jurisdictions. Hence, in analyzing and
formulating rules regarding direct actions, it is helpful to understand the rules that govern
bystander actions.
31. The impact rule requires some physical contact by defendant as a pre-requisite to
permitting a plaintiff to recover for emotional harm. Impact thus serves as a surrogate for
traditional personal injury, and the emotional component is deemed "parasitic." Chamallas &
Kerber, supra note 29, at 819. In time, the impact requirement has become diluted in many
jurisdictions. "Impact" has included a slight blow, a minor burn or electric shock, a slight jolt or
jar, a forcible seating on the floor, dust in the eye, or inhalation of smoke. See, eg., Sam Finley,
Inc. v. Russell, 75 Ga. App. 112,42 S.E.2d 452, 455 (1947); Porter v. Delaware, L. & W.R. Co.,
73 N.J.L. 405, 63 A. 860, 860 (1906). The requirement for impact "has even been satisfied by a
fall brought about by a faint after a collision or the plaintiff's own wrenching of her shoulder in
reaction to fright." PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 20, § 54; see also Howard v. Bloodworth,
137 Ga. App. 478, 224 S.E.2d 122, 123 (1976); Hatfield v. Max Rouse & Sons N.W., 100 Idaho
840, 606 P.2d 944, 955 (1980); Carlenville Nat'l Bank v. Rhoads, 63 Ill. App. 3d 502, 380 N.E.2d
63, 64 (1978), aff'd sub nom. Rickey v. Chicago Transit Auth., 98 Ill. 2d 546, 457 N.E.2d I
(1983); Little v. Williamson, 441 N.E.2d 974, 975 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982).
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distress.3 2  Although impact is no longer required by most courts, 3 3
both the impact rule and the zone-of-danger rule effectuate similar
policy goals. First, both substantially restrict the number of potential
plaintiffs.34 If close proximity to physical harm, whether or not
accompanied by impact, determines the existence of a legal duty, the
class of potential plaintiffs is quite circumscribed.35 The impact and
zone-of-danger rules also purport to facilitate selection of the claims
that are most likely to be genuine; the theory is that emotional harm
inflicted in the setting of a "near miss" is more likely to be genuine and
serious than harm to a person far-removed from the scene of an
injury.36  Finally, because the impact and zone-of-danger rules are
construed quite literally so as to require a concrete physical zone in
32. The zone-of-danger rule is, in a sense, a liberal relative of the impact rule. The nexus to a
directly inflicted physical injury is satisfied by the plaintiff's presence in a location where such an
injury could have occurred. The drafters of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965) adopted
the zone-of-danger rule. Section 436 (2) provides:
If the actor's conduct is negligent as creating an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to another
otherwise than by subjecting him to fright, shock, or other similar ar d immediate emotional
disturbance, the fact that such harm results solely from the internal operation of fright or
other emotional disturbance does not protect the actor from liability.
See, e.g., James v. Harris, 729 P.2d 980 (Colo. App. 1986) (Colorado law recognizes zone-of-
danger rule as set forth by the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 436(2); Williams v. Baker, 572
A.2d 1062 (D.C. 1990) (District of Columbia adopts zone-of-danger rule for direct victims and
declines to recognize bystander recovery); Tibbetts v. Crossroads, Inc., 411 N.W.2d 535, 538
(Minn. Ct. App. 1987) ("[A] plaintiff may not recover damages for negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress unless the plaintiff shows that the defendant's action resulted in either physical
injury or physical danger to the plaintiff.").
33. See, e.g., Owens v. Children's Memorial Hosp., 347 F. Supp 663 (D. Neb. 1972), aff'd,
480 F.2d 465 (8th Cir. 1973); Wallace v. Coca-Cola Bottling Plants, Inc., 269 A.2d 117, 121 (Me.
1970); Bowman v. Williams, 164 Md. 397, 165 A. 182, 184 (1933); First Nat'l Bank v. Langley,
314 So. 2d 324, 338 (Miss. 1975); Niederman v. Brodsky, 436 Pa. Super 401, 261 A.2d 84, 90
(1970); D'Ambra v. United States, 114 R.I. 643, 338 A.2d 524, 531 (1975).
34. Courts view limitation of plaintiffs as a goal in and of itself. See, eg., Tobin v. Grossman,
24 N.Y.2d 609, 249 N.E.2d 419, 424, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 561 (1969); Waube v. Warrington, 216
Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497, 501 (1935).
35. Both rules reduce the likelihood that certain "collateral" plaintiffs will be permitted to
sue. Professor Rabin noted in the context of his article on pure economic harm that "perimeter"
cases involve victims who cannot be identified in advance with much confidence, as well as
persons to whom the consequences of negligence seem distinctly collateral as compared to the
harm suffered by others. Rabin, Tort Recovery for Negligently Inflicted Economic Loss, 37 STAN.
L. REv. 1513, 1521 (1985). The same types of cases arise in the context of actions for damages
that stem from pure emotional harm. With regard to these types of harm, foreseeability is of
limited use as a "guide to liability." Id. The zone-of-danger and impact rules deter collateral
plaintiffs from bringing suit because the physical contact or presence within the zone of danger
tends to indicate that the plaintiff is the focus of the defendant's negligence.
36. See, e.g., Tobin, 249 N.E.2d at 422, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 559. Professors Chamallas and
Kerber trace this justification to a decision by Oliver Wendell Holmes, in Homans v. Boston
Elevated Ry. Co., 180 Mass. 456, 62 N.E. 737 (1902). See Chamallas S- Kerber, supra note 29, at
820.
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which bodily harm would have been possible, they are relatively easy
to apply. Hence, they are responsive to courts' concerns that rules be
administratively feasible. 37
Some jurisdictions, notably California and Hawaii, recognize a duty
to avoid negligent infliction of mental distress even where bodily harm
is not threatened. California seemingly threw caution to the wind in
Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals,38 in which the California
Supreme Court recognized a husband's right to sue for emotional dis-
tress suffered as a result of a doctor's erroneous communication that
the plaintiff's wife had been diagnosed with a venereal disease.
Although the husband was clearly not within a tangible "zone of dan-
ger," the court classified him as a "direct victim" of the doctor's negli-
gence and allowed him to sue on the basis that injury to him was
"foreseeable" and that he had suffered serious and genuine injury. 39
Hawaii had reached a similar result nearly a decade before in Rodri-
gues v. State,' in which a couple was permitted to sue when their
home was negligently damaged by flooding water. These cases
reflected an optimism that courts and juries could distinguish the triv-
ial and fraudulent from the severe and the genuine without the arti-
fices of geographically-based duty limitations. The spectre of liability
disproportionate to the culpability of a defendant,41 a concern often
articulated by the courts, did not outweigh the interests of the plain-
tiffs in compensation.42
37. See eg., Bovsun v. Sanperi, 61 N.Y.2d 219,461 N.E.2d 843, 849, 473 N.Y.S.2d 357, 363
(1984).
38. 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980).
39. Molien. 616 P.2d at 816-17, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 834-35.
40. 52 Haw. 156, 472 P.2d 509 (1970). The Hawaii Supreme Court held that:
[T]he question of whether the defendant is liable to the plaintiff in any particular case will be
solved most justly by the application of general tort principles .... [A] further limitation on
the right of recovery, as in all negligence cases, is that the defendant's obligation to refrain
from particular conduct is owed only to those who are foreseeably endangered by the
conduct and only with respect to those risks or hazards whose likelihood made the conduct
unreasonably dangerous.
Rodrigues, 472 P.2d at 520-21 (citations omitted).
41. See infra text accompanying notes 97-109 for a discussion of what this concept may mean
in the context of actions for damages stemming from emotional distress.
42. Molien was a case that presented a potential for widespread liability in future cases. By
widespread liability, I refer to situations in which a large number of potential claims arise as a
consequence of a single tortious act. As Professor Rabin clearly explains, these situations must
be distinguished from cases in which a course of conduct, such as production of a drug, gives rise
to multiple claims. Rabin, supra note 35, at 1515 n.6. In Molien, recognition of the husband's
claim created the possibility that other "collateral" plaintiffs would seek to bring suit when a
physician's negligence in treating one person caused them to suffer severe emotional distress. In
Rodrigues; the threat was not so much that "collateral" plaintiffs would bring suit as that persons
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Subsequently, both California and Hawaii have restricted, in vary-
ing degrees, the duty rules enunciated in Molien and Rodrigues. Cali-
fornia's restrictions are most dramatic. In Ochoa . Superior Court,43
the California Supreme Court held that parents who had witnessed
their young son fall ill and die an excruciating death from a sickness
that went undiagnosed and untreated by doctors and medical staff at a
youth facility could recover only as bystanders.' The court stated:
Plaintiffs here have not stated a cause of action as direct victims of
defendants' negligence. In Molien defendant's misdiagnosis was, by its
very nature directed at both the wife and the husband. The wife was
asked to tell her husband of the diagnosis and the husband was required
to submit to tests. By contrast, here the defendants' negligence in the
instant case was directed primarily at the decedent, with Mrs. Ochoa
looking on as a helpless bystander as the tragedy of her son's demise
unfolded before her.45
Apart from this illustration of the factual contrast between Molien and
Ochoa, the court did not elaborate as to how lower courts should
determine which plaintiffs were entitled to bring suit as "direct"
victims. 46
In a recent decision, Marlene F v. Affiliated Medical Clinic, Inc.,47
the California Supreme Court emphasized that it did not consider sim-
ple "foreseeability" of harm to the plaintiff to be the raison d'etre of its
decision in Molien and stressed that it had not intended to create a
generalized cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress.48 However, the court recognized a cause of action in favor of a
mother who had enlisted the help of a therapist for both herself and
her son to assist them in dealing with family problems. During the
course of sessions with the son, the therapist had molested the boy. In
acknowledging that the mother stated a cause of action for negligent
infliction of emotional distress, the court emphasized that a duty arose
suffering emotional distress as a result of property damage would bring suit. Thus, a whole new
class of claims for emotional distress became cognizable.
43. 39 Cal. 3d 159, 703 P.2d 1, 216 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1985).
44. Specific rules govern plaintiffs' ability to proceed on a theory that their emotional harm
resulted from concern for the safety of another. Courts refer to these claims as "bystander"
actions. See infra text accompanying notes 54-63.
45. Ochoa, 703 P.2d at 10, 216 Cal. Rptr at 670.
46. In her dissent, Chief Justice Bird argued that the Molien "direct victim" test was
"nothing more than reasonable foreseeability in disguise." Id at 20, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 680 (Bird,
J., dissenting). Despite her assertion, it seems clear that the majority was attempting to apply a
narrower standard. There can be no dispute that a mother witnessing the slow and agonizing
death of her son is a reasonably foreseeable victim of emotional distress.
47. 48 Cal. 3d 583, 770 P.2d 278, 257 Cal. Rptr. 98 (1989).
48. Marlene F., 770 P.2d at 281-82, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 102.
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because of the mother's therapeutic relationship with the therapist.
The court stated:
Damages for severe emotional distress... are recoverable in a negli-
gence action when they result from the breach of a duty owed the plain-
tiff that is assumed by the defendant or imposed on the defendant as a
matter of law, or that arises out of a relationship between the two.49
In Marlene F., the court found that duty arose because of the doctor-
patient relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant.50 While
appearing at first glance to be an expansion of duty in direct actions,"'
Marlene F actually reflects a renewed emphasis in California on a per-
ceived need to limit liability of defendants for damages arising solely
from emotional harm. However, as Part III of this Article illustrates,
the boundaries delineated by the case are far from clear.
Hawaii has imposed less stringent limitations on actions for emo-
tional distress than has California. Hawaii limited its decision in Rod-
rigues by requiring that the plaintiff be "located within a reasonable
distance from the scene of the accident."52 In addition, the Hawaii
legislature abolished causes of action based on emotional distress
caused by damage to material objects unless such distress is accompa-
nied by "physical injury to or mental illness of the person who suffers
the emotional distress or disturbance."53 Thus, Hawaii has attempted
to restrict the class of plaintiffs bringing suit for emotional distress
arising from property damage by imposing more exacting require-
ments for proof of injury.
49. I. at 282, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 102.
50. Id. The court acknowledged that the children's mothers might have proceeded "solely on
the theory that the therapist's acts constituted professional negligence to them in their own
position as his patients." Id. at 283 n.6, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 103 n.6.
51. See Note, Marlene F. v. Affiliated Psychiatric Medical Clinic, Inc.: Negligent Infliction of
Emotional Distress Bounces Out of Bounds 22 PAC. LJ. 189, 211-12 (1990) (arguing that
Marlene F. "opened the door to unlimited liability to all foreseeable plaintiffs who may suffer
emotional distress").
52. Kelley v. Kokua Sales & Supply, Ltd., 56 Haw. 204, 532 P.2d 673, 676 (1975). In Kelley,
the court denied recovery where a grandfather living in California suffered a fatal heart attack
when informed by telephone that his daughter and granddaughter had been killed and another
granddaughter seriously injured as a result of an automobile accident in Hawaii. The court held
that the defendants could not reasonably foresee the consequences to the grandfather because his
location was "too remote." Id. However, in the later case of Campbell v. Animal Quarantine
Station, 63 Haw. 557, 632 P.2d 1066 (1981), the court upheld an award of damages for emotional
distress suffered when the plaintiff's dog died as a reult of defendants' negligence in transporting
the dog to a veterinary hospital. Plaintiffs were informed of the dog's death by telephone the
following day.
53. HAw. REV. STAT. § 22, ch. 663 (1986).
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B. "'Bystander" Actions
Just as most jurisdictions recognize the viability of "direct" actions
for negligent infliction of emotional distress in some circumstances,
most jurisdictions now recognize a "bystander" cause of action when
one suffers fright or shock from witnessing negligently inflicted harm
to a member of one's family. California became the first jurisdiction to
recognize a claim on this basis in the landmark case of Dillon v.
Legg.54 There, the California Supreme Court allowed recovery for a
mother who, though in no danger of physical harm to herself, suffered
emotional harm on seeing her daughter run over by a car. Emphasiz-
ing that the chief element in determining whether a defendant owes a
duty is the foreseeability of risk, the Dillon court identified three fac-
tors that courts should take into account in determining foreseeability:
(1) whether the plaintiff was located near the scene of the accident as
contrasted with a plaintiff who was a distance away from it;
(2) whether shock resulted from the sensory and contemporaneous
observance of the accident as contrasted with learning of the accident
from others after its occurrence; and (3) whether the plaintiff and the
victim were closely related, as contrasted with the absence of any rela-
tionship or the presence of only a distant relationship."5 Despite the
court's expansive opinion, the Dillon rule has a restrictive dimension. 6
The guidelines requiring contemporaneous viewing of the negligent act
and presence at the scene of the accident limit recovery because,
although many people experience distress because of an injury to a
family member, very few actually view such injuries occurring.
Passage of time and a vast array of "bystander"-type actions have
made the California Supreme Court much more concerned about lim-
iting the number of potential plaintiffs than it purported to be when
Dillon was decided. In the recent case of Thing v. La Chusa,5 7 the
California Supreme Court denied a cause of action to a woman who,
from her home, heard another person shout her son's name and who
then found her son lying injured in the street moments after he had
been hit by a car. The court insisted that the Dillon factors were to be
applied strictly and even arbitrarily. 8 The court reasoned that when
applied loosely, the factors had led to distressingly inconsistent results,
and that the public would be better served by tough and consistent
54. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
55. Dillon, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
56. Rabin, supra note 35, at 1526.
57. 48 Cal. 3d 644, 771 P.2d 814, 257 Cal. Rptr. 865 (1989).
58. Thing, 771 P.2d at 828, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 879.
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application of the factors, even if such application is arbitrary.59 Thus,
California now requires that a plaintiff seeking to recover for emo-
tional distress suffered as a percipient witness plead and prove that the
plaintiff is closely related to the injury victim, is present at the scene of
the injury-producing event at the time it occurs, and is then aware that
it is causing injury to the victim. The plaintiff must also show that as a
result, he or she suffered serious emotional distress-a reaction beyond
that which would be anticipated in a disinterested witness and which
is not an abnormal response to the circumstances.'
While most jurisdictions have followed California's lead in recogniz-
ing the right of bystanders to sue for negligent infliction of emotional
distress, the majority of courts has opted to confine bystander actions
to situations in which the bystander is within the zone of danger."
New York, for example, requires the bystander to plead both the exist-
ence of a familial relationship with the primary victim and the location
of the bystander within the zone of physical danger. 2 Despite these
jurisdictions' requirement that the bystander be within the zone of
physical danger, the emotional distress compensated occurs as a result
of witnessing injury to another.63
C. Injury-Related Requirements
In addition to the rules just discussed, most jurisdictions require the
plaintiff in either a bystander or a direct action to plead and prove
some physical injury as a manifestation of the emotional distress
inflicted. 4 Although requiring some manifestation of physical injury
59. Id
60. Id at 829, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 880.
61. This rule thus emphasized the physical location of the plaintiff. Chamallas & Kerber,
supra note 29, at 821. For a discussion of the policy basis for this choice, see infra text
accompanying notes 97-110.
62. Bovsun v. Sanperi, 61 N.Y.2d 219, 461 N.E.2d 843, 848, 473 N.Y.S.2d 357, 362 (1984).
See also PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 20, § 54.
63. Thus, in jurisdictions like New York, a plaintiff could presumably sue both for injuries
sustained as a direct victim (by reason of the plaintiff's presence within the zone of danger) and
for injuries sustained by witnessing negligence to another while present within the zone of
danger. If presence within the zone of danger is required for both, it is not clear why there
should be any distinction between bystander claims and direct claims. It seems doubtful that
plaintiffs can establish which damages arose from fear for themselves and which arose as a result
of fear for family members. See Bovsun, 461 N.E.2d at 848 n.10, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 362 n.10 (1984)
(alluding to the practical difficulties juries face in seeking to separate the emotional distress
suffered by a plaintiff attributable to his own physical injuries from the plaintiff's emotional
distress in consequence of observing an injured or dying family member).
64. PROSSER & KEErON, supra note 20, § 54. This rule is also embodied by the Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 436A, which provides as follows: "If the actor's conduct is negligent as
creating an unreasonable risk of causing either bodily harm or emotional disturbance to another,
Washington Law Review Vol. 67:1, 1992
does not ensure genuineness of a claim, courts tend to agree that it
helps. 65 This view is based on the belief that serious emotional distress
is likely to manifest itself in physical symptoms. Some jurisdictions66
have recognized a limited exception to this requirement in certain nar-
row factual situations which they deem so likely to cause emotional
harm that concerns about genuineness are alleviated. Typically these
exceptions are limited to negligent mishandling of a corpse, or negli-
gent transmission of a message announcing death of a relative or other
news equally likely to cause emotional harm.67 Other jurisdictions,
including California and Hawaii, have departed from the requirement
that the plaintiff allege physical injury, requiring instead that the
plaintiff allege emotional harm so severe that it would cause injury in a
reasonable person similarly situated.6" Thus, these jurisdictions rely
primarily on juries to ascertain which clains are trivial or
fraudulent. 69
and it results in such emotional disturbance alone, without bodily harm or other compensable
damage, the actor is not liable for such emotional disturbance."
65. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 20, § 54.
66. See, eg., Western Union Tel. Co. v. Crumpton, 138 Ala. 632, 36 So. 517 (1913) (negligent
transmission of a message); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Redding, 100 Fla. 495, 129 So. 743, 749
(1930) (same); Russ v. Western Union Tel. Co., 222 N.C. 504, 23 S.E.2d 681, 683 (1943) (same);
see also Spomer v. City of Grand Junction, 144 Colo. 207, 355 P.2d 960, 963 (1960) (negligent
mishandling of a corpse); Papieves v. Lawrence, 437 Pa. 373, 263 A.2d 118, 121 (1970) (same);
Whitehair v. Highland Memory Gardens, Inc., 327 S.E.2d 438, 443 (W. Va. 1985) (same); see
also PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 20, § 54.
67. See, eg., Johnson v. Jamaica Hosp., 62 N.Y.2d 523, 467 N.E.2d 502, 478 N.Y.S.2d 838
(1984); see also M. FRANKIN & R. RAnIN, TORT LAW AND ALTESNATiVES 291-92 (4th ed.
1987). These exceptions also serve the purpose of allowing courts to recognize the actionability
of a claim without a major departure from the zone-of-danger rule. See Johnson v. State, 37
N.Y.2d 378, 334 N.E.2d 590, 372 N.Y.S.2d 638 (1975).
68. See Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831
(1980). The court noted that "the general standard of proof required to support a claim of
mental distress is some guarantee of genuineness in the circumstanee. of the case." Molien, 616
P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839 (quoting Rodrigues v. State, 52 Haw. 156, 472 P.2d 509, 520
(1970)). The Rodrigues court was somewhat more explicit than the quote from Molien reveals,
having defined the standard as follows: "[S]erious mental distress may be found where a
reasonable man, normally constituted, would be unable to adequately zope with the mental stress
engendered by the circumstances of the case." Rodrigues, 472 P.2d at 520.
Professors Chamallas and Kerber argue that courts have long viewed women as hyper-
sensitive, and, hence, have deemed their distress unworthy of recovery. Chamallas and Kerber
contend that courts were comparing women to male, and therefore, non-pregnant individuals.
Chamallas & Kerber, supra note 29, at 827-34. The Molien and Rodrigues standards might be
viewed as institutionalizing courts' inclinations to compare the harm suffered with that likely to
be felt by the reasonable man and therefore minimizing certain types of mental distress.
Chamallas and Kerber applaud the "feminization" of tort law, in which the notion of physical
harm is expanded to encompass "a woman's experience in the physical and social experience of
pregnancy and in the socially constructed experience of motherhood." Id. at 862.
69. However, in Thing v. La Chusa, 48 Cal. 3d 644, 771 P.2d 814, 830, 257 Cal. Rptr. 865,
881 (1989), the California Supreme Court placed the requirement of proof of serious injury ("a
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III. EVALUATING THE VALIDITY AND EFFECTIVENESS
OF RULES GOVERNING DIRECT ACTIONS
Section II identified the legal framework courts utilize to decide
whether claims for damages arising from negligently inflicted emo-
tional distress should be actionable. Having established this founda-
tion, this section scrutinizes the law pertaining to direct actions for
emotional distress by evaluating the validity and effectiveness of the
dominant legal rules. The work of numerous legal scholars is consid-
ered in this context.70 Their writings serve both as sources of insight
into the existing rules, and as founts of ideas regarding the direction
the law should take.
A. A Preliminary Question: Should Duty Be Limited?
This subsection examines the validity of the position that duty limi-
tations on recovery of damages for emotional distress are warranted.
As noted in section II, many policy rationales have traditionally been
reaction beyond that which would be anticipated in a disinterested witness and which is not an
abnormal response to the circumstances") in a paragraph describing the other pleading and proof
requirements for Dillon actions, thus suggesting that judges should scrutinize the pleadings to
ascertain if this requirement is facially satisfied. In Molien, 616 P.2d at 921, 167 Cal. Rptr. at
930, the court had insisted the determination was entirely a matter for the jury.
70. Bell, The Bell Tolls" Toward Full Tort Recovery for Psychic Injury, 36 U. FLA. L. Rnv.
333 (1984); Diamond, Dillon v. Legg Revisited- Toward a Unified Theory of Compensating
Bystandeia and Relatives for Intangible Injuries, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 477 (1984); Ingber,
Rethinking Intangible Injuries A Focus on Remedy, 73 CAt. L. REV. 772 (1985); Leibson,
Recovery of Damages for Emotional Distress Caused by Physical Injury to Another, 15 J. FAM. L.
163 (1976); Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts 49 HARV. L.
REv. 1033 (1936); Miller, The Scope of Liability for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress"
Making "ihe Punishment Fit the Crime," 1 U. HAWAII L. REv. 1 (1979); Nolan & Ursin,
Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress Coherence Emerging from Chaos, 33 HASTINGS L..
583 (1982); Pearson, Liability for Negligently Inflicted Psychic Harm A Response to Professor
Bell, 36 U. FLA. L. REv. 413 (1984) [hereinafter Pearson, Response to Professor Bell]; Pearson,
Liability to Bystanders for Negligently Inflicted Emotional Harm-A Comment on the Nature of
Arbitrary Rules, 34 U. FLA. L. REv. 477 (1982) [hereinafter Pearson, Liability to Bystanders];
Comment, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: Reconciling the Bystander and Direct
Victim Causes of Action, 18 U.S.F.L. REv. 145 (1983); Comment, Molien v. Kaiser Foundation
Hospitals: California Expands Liability for Negligently Inflicted Emotional Distress, 33
HASTINGS L.J. 291 (1981); Comment, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: New Horizons
After Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 13 PAC. L.J. 179 (1981); Comment, Dillon
Revisited: Toward a Better Paradigm for Bystander Cases, 43 OHIo ST. L.. 931 (1982); Note,
Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals: Negligence Actions for Emotional Distress and Loss of
Consortium Without Physical Injury, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 1142 (1981); Note, Negligent Infliction
of Mental Distress: Reaction to Dillon v. Legg in California and Other States; 25 HASTINGS L.J.
1248 (1974); Note, Limiting Liability for the Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: The
"Bystander Recovery" Cases; 54 S. CAL L. REv. 847 (1981); Note, One Step Beyond the Zone of
Danger Limitation Upon Recovery for the Negligent Infliction of Mental Distress, 43 TEMPLE L.Q.
59 (1969).
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invoked to justify denial of recovery for damages caused by negligent
infliction of emotional distress. 7 1 While many of these have been dis-
credited, two have withstood the test of time. First, courts have con-
tinually expressed their fears that unlimited access to the legal system
in emotional distress cases would increase exponentially the liability of
negligent defendants to an extent far outweighing the defendants' cul-
pability and society's ability to pay.7 2 Second, although most courts
do not believe the possibility of fraudulent or trivial claims is grave
enough to merit outright rejection of all claims for negligent infliction
of emotional distress, they perceive that firm limits on actionability are
necessary to forestall the bulk of such claims.73 Apart from these two
predominant justifications for limits on recovery, courts have
expressed concern that the rules chosen must allow the judiciary to
resolve cases in what is perceived, by judges and the public, as a fair
manner. Fairness in this context must not only encompass a sense of
consistency in the treatment of like claims, but in addition, the rules
that promote consistency must themselves reflect meaningful
choices.74 Concern for the administrative feasibility of formulating
rules and the fairness of the rules selected has militated in favor of
limiting recovery,75 or even denying recovery altogether. 76
Notwithstanding judicial caution, some scholars have challenged
the assumption that abandonment of rigid duty limitations would
result in major increases in the liability of negligent defendants in an
amount disproportionate to fault. Professors Nolan and Ursin, for
example, urge adoption of the Molien/Rodrigues standard of foresee-
ability plus seriousness of injury as a single standard to be utilized in
all emotional distress cases. 77  They assert that foreseeability as a
screening device in cases of physical injury is well..accepted, and that
there is no convincing evidence that actions for negligent infliction of
emotional distress require more stringent screening rules.78 However,
71. See supra text accompanying notes 21-30.
72. Rabin, supra note 35, at 1524-25.
73. Id.
74. This theme was articulated by Justice Kaufman in his concurring opinion in Thing v. La
Chusa, 48 Cal. 3d 644, 771 P.2d 814, 830-36, 257 Cal. Rptr. 865, 881-87 (1989). Fairness
concerns also led the court to strictly limit duty in bystander cases because the court perceived
that alternative as more just than inconsistent application of the rules. Thing, 771 P.2d at 815,
827, 828, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 866, 878, 879. Professor Rabin identifies this concern as the difficulty
of defining the threshold harm. Rabin, supra note 35, at 1524-25.
75. This has been the course taken by most jurisdictions. Section II of this Article gives an
overview of the types of limits applied.
76. Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 249 N.E.2d 419, 424, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 561 (1969).
77. Nolan & Ursin, supra note 70, at 609-11.
78. Id.
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to the extent that some additional protection against an onslaught of
claims is required, Nolan and Ursin believe that a showing of serious-
ness of injury would suffice. 9
Approaching the issue from the standpoint of economic efficiency
coupled with fairness concerns, Professor Bell goes even farther, argu-
ing that a full recovery rule-one that allows recovery for all psychic
injury foreseeably caused by defendant's conduct-is desirable and
should be adopted."0 In an article that addresses virtually every possi-
ble objection to full recovery, Professor Bell examines the effects of a
full recovery rule on accident costs.8" In Bell's view, the strongest
argument favoring full recovery for psychic injury is that any other
rule results in inadequate deterrence of tortious activity because a
defendant's conduct does not take into account the full costs of the
tortious activity engaged in. 2 In addition, Professor Bell believes that
psychiatric and psychological examining techniques have reduced the
possibility that a plaintiff could feign injury, and hence rules that are
geared toward prevention of fraudulent claims are outdated. 3 Uncer-
tainty of the damages suffered, a concern to some courts, is likewise
not a problem because damages for psychic injury are no more indefi-
nite than other damages.8 4
Professor Bell rejects fears of unlimited liability, leading either to
bankruptcy or unavailability of insurance, as a justification for limits
79. iL at 611. The authors recognize that tangible loss is more deserving of compensation
than intangible loss, but believe that the seriousness criterion is a better guide to emotional
distress actions that will involve tangible loss than a physical injury requirement would be. Id. at
614. Referring to the Molien/Rodrigues discussions of the issue, the authors state that the
seriousness criterion "refers to severe and debilitating emotional injury with its attendant painful
mental suffering and anguish-injury of grave intensity and duration, as opposed to injury of a
trivial and transient nature." Id. at 615.
80. Bell, supra note 70, at 335.
81. Professor Bell utilizes the analytical structure articulated by Professor Guido Calabresi,
taking into account primary, secondary and tertiary accident costs. Professor Calabresi
described accident costs resulting directly from the injury as primary accident costs. Secondary
accident costs are the costs to society if an injury occurs. Tertiary costs are the transaction costs
of redressing accidents. G. CALABREsI, THE Cos oF AcCIDENTs 26-28 (1970).
82. Bell, supra note 70, at 349.
83. Id. at 351.
84. Even damages that do not appear to be intangible, such as future lost earning capacity,
involve many intangible characteristics. A jury must divine the probable working life of the
plaintiff, as well as the career pattern the plaintiff would have experienced absent the injury. Id
at 362. Hence, in Bell's view, any contention that the damages for emotional distress cannot be
calculated is unfounded. But see Pearson, Response to Professor Bell, supra note 70, at 423 -26.
Professor Pearson, in responding to Professor Bell's article, argues that although there are
various forms of intangible injury, there are enough differences between them to merit
distinctions between them. l
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on liability because such fears are not based on any empirical proof8 5
In addition, Bell rejects fears of a flood of litigation on the ground that
the legal system should focus on the types of cases it permits and the
societal benefits that accrue from those cases rather than on the sheer
number of cases entering the system. 6 Professor Bell's only real reser-
vation about a full recovery rule is that it encourages trivial claims to
be brought.87 His ultimate conclusion is that rules designed to weed
out small claims create their own transaction costs, and that it may be
more cost-efficient to permit recovery in trivial cases.88
In contrast to Professor Bell, most scholars concur with the judici-
ary in recognizing the necessity of limits on liability.89 Several impor-
tant points emerge from their analyses. First, while the sheer volume
of cases likely to be filed in court should not be a concern, the reality
of recognizing an unlimited right to recover for negligent infliction of
emotional distress is that the ultimate liability of individual defendants
will increase substantially.90 Virtually every negligent act has the
potential to cause emotional distress to someone. For example, in
cases in which medical malpractice is committed upon a child, it is
clear that parents, siblings, grandparents, and possibly friends, will
suffer emotional distress of some sort. Where severe injury to the
child is involved, the distress suffered by a family is likely to be
profound. The ultimate result of recognizing a cause of action in every
case in which emotional harm is suffered, or even in those cases in
which serious harm is suffered, would be a dramatic increase in the
liability of defendants. Our society would have to be prepared to
absorb the costs of this increased liability, for these costs would be
passed along in the form of higher insurance premiums as well as
increased prices for products and services. The need for monetary
recovery in all cases of negligently caused emotional distress is not
sufficiently compelling to justify assumption of these costs.91 Second,
judges, and members of society generally, have every right to be con-
85. Bell, supra note 70, at 362-65.
86. Id. at 377-79. Professor Bell foresees no difficulty for attorneys or juries in utilizing the
proposed rule. I at 386-88.
87. He defines trivial claims as those involving injuries so insignificant that the costs of
resolving them may outweigh the benefits of allowing compensation. Id at 384-85.
88. Id. at 386-88.
89. See, eg., Pearson, Liability to Bystanders, supra note 70. Professor Pearson believes that
strong arguments can be made in favor of a no recovery rule, but ultimately finds justifications
for a limited cause of action. Id at 502-05. See also text accompanying notes 121-45 for the
proposals of Professors Miller, Diamond and Ingber.
90. See, eg., Pearson, Liability to Bystanders, supra note 70, at 506.
91. Professor Pearson contends that in cases of negligently inflict-d harm, as in negligence
cases generally, compensation rather than vindication is the primary goal. His belief is that the
Vol. 67:1, 1992
Direct Actions for Emotional Harm
cerned about screening and preventing recovery for trivial claims. The
costs of processing and settling such claims directly impact the public
at large. Also, there is no particularly compelling reason why psychic
trauma of any type or magnitude should be compensated in a world
where many types of tangible harm are not.92 In a society of scarce
resources, it is fair to assume that minor emotional injuries will heal in
time and that it is therefore best to attempt to designate the claims
most likely to result in severe trauma.
To the extent that limits on recovery are desirable, the rules adopted
ought to reflect sound policy judgments regarding the selection of
claims allowed to proceed to trial. This concern militates in favor of
utilizing duty rules as a first hurdle to recovery rather than allowing
juries to compensate as they see fit. Jurors simply lack the perspective
to make policy decisions about what kinds of claims ought to be
actionable.93
In light of the considerations noted above, the consensus among
most scholars and the overwhelming majority of courts is that neither
a full recovery rule, nor a limited duty rule based on foreseeability of
harm plus serious injury presents a workable solution. However, a flat
"no recovery" rule seems equally unfair. Some emotional injuries,
though intangible, may be as painful and as "real" as some physical
injuries.9 4 Further, despite the theoretical and practical challenges
that intangible injuries pose, lawyers and juries already work with
these types of cases in numerous contexts.95 The challenge, then, is to
typical claim for emotional distress is trivial and this is why courts have been reluctant to allow
recovery. Id at 507.
92. See, eg., Ingber, supra note 70, at 776-77 (pointing out that the element of proximate
cause is used to restrict liability on some very tangible types of harm, such as economic losses);
Rabin, supra note 35, at 1518-21 (discussing duty limitations on certain types of cases involving
pure economic loss).
93. Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, 28 COLUM. L. REv. 1014 (1928) (in which
the author identifies administrative, ethical or moral, economic, prophylactic, and justice factors
as the most important determinants of recognition of duty). But see Abel, supra note 21, at 826
(arguing that duty as an element in tort is an incoherent element and should be eliminated).
94. Professor Abel argues, however, that even if emotional injuries are real, payments for
disruption of relationships or for pain and suffering commodify and dehumanize the emotions.
See Abel, supra note 21, at 804-06. He argues that intangible harm should not be compensated.
Id. at 823. He would, however, make compensation for personal injury available regardless of
fault. Under his proposal, the state would provide income compensation and medical care. Id.
95. The most commonly compensated type of intangible injury is pain and suffering, which is
really another form of emotional distress that is deemed "parasitic" to some direct physical
injury. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 20, § 54. Numerous commentators have asserted that
pain and suffering should not be a compensable injury in tort. See, eg., Jaffe, Damages for
Personal Injury: The Impact of Insurance, 18 LAw & CONT. PROB. 219, 235 (1953) (arguing that
with the widespread existence of insurance, there must be "a reconsideration of the kinds of
interests which are compensated and the degrees of compensation" and predicting that
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determine which types of claims for emotional harm deserve compen-
sation and to develop rules that maximize the policies society seeks to
further while still allowing adequate recovery for negligent infliction of
emotional distress.
B. Evaluating the Rules That Limit Recovery in Direct Actions
This subsection is based on the assumption that limits on recovery
are needed and evaluates the extent to which the rules utilized in
direct actions effectuate the basic policy concerns associated with emo-
tional distress claims. In terms of imposing limits on the class of
plaintiffs permitted to bring suit, the zone-of-danger rule has proven to
be effective. A pure foreseeability-plus-serious-injury rule, such as
that articulated by the Molien and Rodrigues cases, does not impose
tangible limits at the duty stage. Yet, while limiting the number of
claims is a significant concern, the validity of the lines drawn by the
rules is of greater importance.9 6 This section demonstrates that the
rules utilized in direct actions do not fulfill fundamental policy goals
to the extent that they should.
1. The Zone-of-Danger Rule
Although the zone-of-danger rule has been attacked by some as
arbitrary and completely without foundation,97 in reality its merits are
worthy of serious consideration. There is no question that the rule
limits claims and does so in a relatively concrete and consistent man-
protection must shrink toward the minimum level of economic loss); Morris, Liability for Pain
and Suffering, 59 COLUM. L. REv. 476 (1959) (arguing that where pain and suffering has not
resulted in actual pecuniary loss, it should not be compensated); Peck, Compensation for Pain: A
Reappraisal in Light of New Medical Evidenc 72 MICH. L. REV. 1355 (1974) (suggesting that
society may reinforce and prolong pain by awarding damages as liberally as is the case under the
current system of loss allocation).
Despite these long-standing objections to pain and suffering, it is still routinely awarded in
personal injury cases, although in some instances, limitations on the amount of pain and suffering
awarded have been imposed as a means of achieving tort reform. See, eg, CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 3333.2 (1991), which places a $250,000 limit on noneconomic damages that a malpractice
claimant may recover.
96. Although clearcut lines between plaintiffs are inevitable in a system that limits those
permitted to sue, limitations are not necessarily arbitrary. As Professor Pearson argues,
arbitrariness may occur when a rule is broader or narrower than its unlerlying policy suggests it
should be. Pearson, Liability to Bystanders, supra note 70, at 480. A rule may also be said to be
arbitrary when it is "stated so vaguely as to provide insufficient guidance to those whose function
it is to apply and enforce the rule." Id. at 483.
97. See, eg., Dziokonski v. Babineau, 375 Mass. 555, 380 N.E.2d 1295, 1300 (1978) (the rule
"lacks strong logical support"); Porter v. Jaffee, 84 N.J. 88, 417 A.2d 521, 525 (1980) (zone of
risk referred to as "artful yet artificial"); Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 404 A.2d 672, 677 (1979)
(criticizing the harshness and artificiality of the rule); Landreth v. Reed, 570 S.W.2d 486, 489
(Tex. Civ. App. 1978).
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ner.98 The basic premise of the rule is that the parameters of the duty
to avoid negligent infliction of emotional harm ought to be commensu-
rate with the duty to avoid creation of unreasonable risks of physical
harm. 99 In jurisdictions that utilize the zone-of-danger rule to deter-
mine which plaintiffs may pursue recovery for emotional distress, a
defendant's liability costs will increase due to the recognition of emo-
tional harm as a compensable injury.100 Courts utilizing the rule view
the increase in liability costs as one that is proportionate to fault. This
perception of proportionality stems from the fact that a duty will not
extend to an unlimited chain of people affected by the defehdant's neg-
ligence, but instead, will extend only to persons to whom the defend-
ant already owes a duty to avoid negligent infliction of physical
harm. 101 While proportionality is a relative and subjective concept, 0 2
the zone-of-danger rule provides a rational basis for distinguishing
among potential plaintiffs. In situations in which the defendant unrea-
sonably creates a risk of bodily harm to the plaintiff, the defendant
engages in a type of conduct that is both culpable and tangible. 10 In a
sense, the threat of the harm caused distinguishes the relationship
between the plaintiff and the defendant from a relationship a defend-
98. But see Justice Kaye's dissent in Bovsun v. Sanperi, 61 N.Y.2d 219, 461 N.E.2d 843, 854,
473 N.Y.S.2d 357, 368 n.2 (arguing that the limitations the rule imposes will most often pose jury
questions that preclude dismissal of a case prior to trial).
99. See supra text accompanying notes 31-36.
100. This increase in liability costs is an obvious result of any rule permitting recovery of
damages caused by negligently inflicted emotional harm.
101. As the court stated in Bovsun, in the context of a bystander action:
Recognition of this right to recover for emotional distress attributable to observation of
injuries suffered by a member of the immediate family involves a broadening of the duty
concept but-unlike the Dillon approach-not the creation of a duty to a plaintiff to whom
the defendant is not already recognized as owing a duty to avoid bodily harm. In so doing it
permits recovery for an element of damages not heretofore allowed. Use of the zone-of-
danger rule thus mitigates the possibility of unlimited recovery ....
Bovsun, 61 N.Y.2d at 229, 461 N.E.2d at 847, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 361. The same rationale applies
to use of the zone-of-danger rule to determine when an individual may bring suit in a direct
action for emotional distress.
102. Certainly there in no magic formula that indicates the point at which liability becomes
disproportionate to fault. While many courts are concerned with ensuring that liability will
remain proportionate to fault, few articulate how they gauge that proportionality. In the context
of intangible injury such as emotional distress, Professor Rabin's thoughts regarding recovery of
damages by "collateral" plaintiffs seem most applicable. In many cases, emotional distress may
be suffered by persons who seem "collateral" in some sense to the defendant's negligence. See
supra note 35.
103. This tangibility of the contact between plaintiff and defendant is an important aspect of
both the zone-of-danger and the impact rules. The thought is that absent some substantial event
alerting the defendant to the danger posed to the plaintiff, the defendant may have no occasion to
recollect the injury or even realize that the plaintiff was injured. Hence, defense of the action
would be virtually impossible. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 20, § 54.
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ant may have with other persons who might be affected emotionally by
defendant's conduct."° Considering the issue from the standpoint of
fairness to the defendant, payment of damages to plaintiffs who were
in danger of immediate physical harm as a result of negligence seems
fair.105 By making damages for emotional distress actionable, courts
merely recognize a broader and more realistic spectrum of potential
injury.
Much of the criticism of the zone-of-danger rule stems from the
exclusion of persons who suffer distress as a result of negligence with-
out a threat of physical harm. In many cases, harm to individuals
outside a zone of physical danger is utterly foreseeable. As Professors
Harper, James and Gray aptly state, "The zone of psychic danger is
more extensive than the zone of the foreseeable hazard of physical
impact." 10 6 If courts were principally concerned with creating a legal
framework to compensate foreseeable victims of negligence who hap-
pen to suffer emotional harm, the zone-of-danger rule would clearly be
suspect, because it subdivides a single group of foreseeable plaintiffs
based on a distinction that may seem unrelated to the injury suf-
104. For example, suppose a negligent driver nearly kills a pedestrian who is crossing the
street. The circumstances forge a link between driver and pedestrian that results from the threat
of harm to the pedestrian. The threat of harm isolates driver and pedestrian in a relationship
that is very different from the driver's relationship to other pedestrians who witness the near-miss
and who suffer emotional harm as a result.
105. In such cases, it is fortuitous that physical injury did not occur as an immediate result of
the negligent act. Given the defendant's obligation to utilize reasonable care to prevent such
harm, it seems fair to recognize the obligation to compensate a seriously injured plaintiff for
emotional distress that occurred instead. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436
comment f (1965) (adopting the reasoning that a failure to impose liability would result in
insulating a defendant from liability simply because the harm was brcught about in an unusual
manner).
In addition, the plaintiff's presence within the zone of physical danger puts the defendant on
notice of the need for precautions with regard to the plaintiff's safety. An underlying premise of
the fault system is that it is unfair to impose liability when the defendant could not have
undertaken precautions. Although foreseeability of harm to the plairtiff is a good indicator of
the need for precautions in cases involving tangible physical injury, it is a poor indicator when
intangible injury is concerned. With respect to intangible injury like emotional distress, a
defendant would be required to anticipate innumerable injuries. The uncertainty of estimating
what injuries are possible would make any assessment of precautions difficult, and would add
only marginal deterrence against endangering conduct. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co.,
159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
106. 3 F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, THE LAW OF ToitTs § 18.4 (2d ed. 1986)
[hereinafter HARPER & JAMES]; see also Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 917, 69
Cal. Rptr. 72, 80 (1968); D'Amicol v. Alvarez Shipping Co., Inc., 31 Conn. Supp. 164, 326 A.2d
129, 131 (1973); Barnhill v. Davis, 300 N.W.2d 104, 107 (Iowa 191); Culbert v. Sampson's
Supermarkets, Inc., 441 A.2d 433, 436 (Me. 1982); Ferriter v. Daniel O'Connell's Sons, Inc., 381
Mass. 507, 413 N.E.2d 690, 696-97 (1980) (loss of parental consortium action permitted); Corso
v. Merrill, 119 N.H. 647, 406 A.2d 300, 303-04 (1979); Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 404 A.2d 672,
683 (1979).
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fered.107 Assuming limits are to be imposed, however, foreseeability
cannot serve as the basis for imposition of those limits.108 The ulti-
mate question remains whether, despite its drawbacks, the zone-of-
danger rule suggests a sensible means of identiIying the instances in
which a defendant may fairly be called to answer for emotional dis-
tress damages.
The greatest problem with the zone-of-danger rule is that courts
apply it more narrowly than its underlying rationale justifies. If the
zone-of-danger rule is intended to make emotional distress damages
cognizable in cases in which there is some pre-existing obligation
between the plaintiff and the defendant (other than sheer foreseeability
of harm), there is little reason to confine application of the rule to
cases in which plaintiff is placed at physical risk merely in a literal and
geographic sense. A wide range of relationships between a plaintiff
and defendant may make it fair to impose liability for damages arising
from emotional distress despite the fact that bodily harm is not
threatened in a literal sense.Y09
Finally, it is appropriate to distinguish use of the zone-of-danger
rule in direct actions from its use in bystander actions. Much of the
validity of the rule in the context of direct actions stems from the per-
ceived fairness of the limitation imposed. That is, the plaintiffs permit-
ted to bring suit are those to whom a defendant clearly owes a legal
obligation to refrain from imposing unreasonable risks of physical
harm. If a jurisdiction embraces the notion that emotional harm suf-
fered by viewing a negligent act to another should be compensable,
there seems little reason, other than sheer limitation of the number of
actions brought, to require that the percipient witnesses be present in
the zone of physical danger themselves.110
107. I disagree with this criticism because, as noted above, the rationale of the zone-of-danger
rule extends beyond the issue of creation of a risk of physical harm. Creation of a risk of physical
harm is relevant because it indicates the degree of relationship between the plaintiff and the
defendant.
108. See infra text accompanying notes 113-14.
109. Consider, for example, the case of parents who assert a medical malpractice action
against a doctor for failure to advise them that the child the wife is carrying will be born with
Down's Syndrome. In Bovsun v. Sanperi, 61 N.Y.2d 226, 461 N.E.2d 843, 849, 473 N.Y.S.2d
357, 363 (1984), the court characterized this scenario (presented by the actual case of Becker v.
Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 814, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 902 (1978)) as one in which
the existence of duty was properly denied because plaintiffs were not exposed to bodily harm. I
believe the rationale of the zone-of-danger rule adequately supports the actionability of such a
claim.
110. One might question why a zone-of-danger jurisdiction would choose to focus on the
availability of damages to percipient witnesses if each percipient witness has his or her own
independent action based on a threat of bodily harm as well. Indeed, some jurisdictions adhering
to the zone-of-danger rule do not purport to recognize percipient witness claims. See, ag., James
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2. The Foreseeability Standard
Although Professors Nolan and Ursin' and other scholars 12 have
sung the praises of rules based on foreseeability ac-ompanied by seri-
ous harm, a foreseeability rule is subject to criticism on various
grounds. Taken literally, foreseeability is a "non-standard," because
some emotional harm is virtually always foreseeable. 1 3 If foreseeabil-
ity is the determining factor in selecting the plaintiffs permitted to sue,
no legitimate limitation on the number of plaintiffs can be made. Each
negligent act may give rise to any number of claims. Moreover, the
number of claims arising out of any one negligent act or omission may
bear no particular relation to the culpability of the defendant.
In addition, a foreseeability rule relies on the jury to set limits on
recovery for emotional harm, while providing the jury with absolutely
no understanding of the spectrum of cases that arise or the impact on
society as a whole. To the extent that judges attempt to pre-screen
cases on the basis of "foreseeability," they too lack guidelines to
ensure consistency among potential plaintiffs.114 The rule does not
invite courts or juries to consider any of the policy reasons for limiting
duty in determining who should be entitled to reco>ver.
3. Genuine and Serious Injury or Physical Consequences
Rules pertaining to the magnitude of the injury a plaintiff seeking to
recover for emotional harm must suffer are designed to serve as a bar-
rier to fraudulent and trivial claims.1 ' The physical consequences
rule, adhered to by most courts, has been criticized on the ground that
v. Harris, 729 P.2d 986 (Colo. App. 1986). Other zone-of-danger jurisdictions distinguish
percipient witness claims even though all emotional distress claims are based on the zone-of-
danger rule. See, e.g., Bovsun, 461 N.E.2d at 843, 473 N.Y.S.2d ar. 357. Although it would
appear impossible to establish which damages were caused by fear to oneself and which were
caused by reason of viewing injury to a loved one, courts may believe that in some cases, juries
would attribute the majority of the plaintiff's damages to the plaintiff's status as a percipient
witness and hence, in the absence of a duty to bystanders, damage would be perceived as much
less significant.
111. See Nolan & Ursin, supra note 70, at 609-11.
112. See, eg., Comment, Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospita. C2lifornia Expands Liability
for Negligently Inflicted Emotional Distress 33 HAsINGs L.J. 291 (1981); see also Ochoa v.
Superior Court, 39 Cal. 3d 159, 703 P.2d 1, 27, 216 Cal. Rptr. 661, 687 (1985) (Bird, J.,
dissenting).
113. See, eg., Rabin, supra note 35, at 1526 (arguing that foresee.bility provides no limit on
liability for nonphysical harm).
114. This problem is exacerbated in jurisdictions like California, where the open-endedness of
the foreseeability rule led to confusion about which plaintiffs should sue as bystanders and which
should sue as direct victims. Pearson, Liability to Bystanders, supra note 70, at 515.
115. See supra text accompanying notes 64-69.
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it has no obvious relation to emotional harm.116 Hence, while the
physical consequences rule may limit claims, it may also allow claims
in which the emotional harm suffered is not genuine, and exclude
claims in which the harm suffered is real.1 7 Numerous commentators
and courts have observed that developments in science enable experts
to adequately distinguish between trivial and non-trivial emotional dis-
tress without reliance on physical consequences of harm. 1 8 These
criticisms have led many courts to reject the requirement that emo-
tional harm be substantiated by physical manifestations. 19
The alternative to the physical injury rule is to require pleading and
proof of serious and genuine injury. However, because a serious and
genuine injury rule would permit the admission of evidence that is
"intangible" in the sense that it may not be tied to some physical ail-
ment, it is possible that trivial or fraudulent injuries are more likely to
be submitted to the jury and to be compensated either through settle-
ment or jury verdicts. Some jurisdictions require that the harm suf-
116. See Comment, Fear for Another: Psychological Theory and the Right to Recovery, 1969
LAW & Soc. ORD. 420. The author argues that although courts have required proof of a
physical injury as a way to limit fraudulent claims, given the present sophistication of
psychological testing and research and the availability of expert testimony to weed out fictions or
exaggerated claims, plaintiffs should be allowed to pursue actions for mental distress
unaccompanied by physical injury. Further, the author argues that genuine emotional distress is
no less serious an injury than a physical disorder and should be compensable.
117. See supra note 116.
118. See, eg., Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 821, 167 Cal.
Rptr. 831, 839 (1970); Rodrigues v. State, 52 Haw. 156, 472 P.2d 509, 520 (1975); D'Ambra v.
United States, 114 RI. 643, 338 A.2d 524, 532 (1975) (Kelleher, J., concurring); see also Nolan
& Ursin, supra note 70, at 614-19 (adopting the approach undertaken by Molien).
119. Eighteen states have now abandoned the physical manifestation rule. Alabama: Farmers
& Merchants Bank v. Hancock, 506 So. 2d 305 (Ala. 1987); Taylor v. Baptist Medical Center,
Inc., 400 So. 2d 369 (Ala. 1981). California: Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616
P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980). Connecticut: Morris v. Hartford Courant Co., 200 Conn.
676, 513 A.2d 66 (1986); Montinieri v. Southern New England Tel. Co., 175 Conn. 337, 398
A.2d 1180 (1978). Hawaii: Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Haw. 398, 520 P.2d 758 (1974); Rodrigues v.
State, 52 Haw. 156, 472 P.2d 509 (1970). Iowa: Barnhill v. Davis, 300 N.W.2d 104 (Iowa 1981).
Louisiana: Chappetta v. Bowman Transp., Inc., 415 So. 2d 1019 (La. Ct. App. 1982). Maine:
Culbert v. Sampson's Supermarkets, Inc., 444 A.2d 433 (Me. 1982). Missouri: Bass v. Nooney
Co., 646 S.W.2d 765 (Mo. 1983) (en bane); Davis v. Shelton, 710 S.W.2d 8 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
Montana: Johnson v. Supersave Markets, Inc., 686 P.2d 209 (Mont. 1984). Nebraska: James v.
Lieb, 221 Neb. 47, 375 N.W.2d 109 (1985). New Jersey: Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 106 N.J.
557, 525 A.2d 287 (1987); Porter v. Jaffee, 84 N.J. 88, 417 A.2d 521 (1980). New York: Battalla
v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961). North Dakota: Wetham v.
Bismarck Hosp., 197 N.W.2d 678 (N.D. 1972). Ohio: Paugh v. Hanks, 6 Ohio St. 3d 72, 451
N.E.2d 759 (1983); Schultz v. Barberton Glass Co., 4 Ohio St. 3d 131, 447 N.E.2d 109 (1983).
Pennsylvania: Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 404 A.2d 672 (1979). Texas: St. Elizabeth Hosp. v.
Garrard, 730 S.W.2d 649 (Tex. 1987). Washington: Hunsley v. Giard, 87 Wash. 2d 424, 553
P.2d 1096 (1976) (dicta). Wyoming: Gates v. Richardson, 719 P.2d 193 (Wyo. 1986).
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fered be more than an ordinary person could bear, on the theory that
this hurdle will forestall litigation of marginal or fraudulent claims.120
C. Evaluating Other Proposals for Change
The commentators discussed above have developed their arguments
concerning the appropriate scope of liability for damages caused by
emotional distress by building on the foundation of the predominant
rules. Professor Bell, for example, bases his proposal for a full recov-
ery rule on the principle of foreseeability, but contemplates such a
broad application that claims would virtually never be limited by a
court on a motion to dismiss.121 Other scholars have departed from
any connection to the rules most courts utilize in cases involving emo-
tional distress and have instead proposed a rule that would limit
recovery by restricting the available damages.1 22 While these sugges-
tions are responsive to much of the criticism aiaed at the current
rules, they possess their own flaws.
The provocative theory of damage limitation endorsed and
explained in articles by Professors Miller, 123 Diamond,12 4 and
Ingber,125 would limit recovery for damages caused by negligently
inflicted emotional harm to past and future out-of-pocket economic
loss. 126 One strength of this approach is that it would remove the arbi-
trary barriers to liability posed by the existing duty rules1 27 and reduce
litigation over the scope of those rules. In theory, many more victims
of emotional distress would be allowed to recover because access to the
courts would be almost unlimited so long as a plaintiff could prove
economic loss. 128 The tradeoff for this liberality in permitting suits is
that awards would tend to be much lower than those now available.1 29
120. See supra text accompanying notes 68-69.
121. Bell, supra note 70, at 335. Professor Bell's approach was derived from Paugh v. Hanks,
6 Ohio St. 3d 72, 451 N.E.2d 759 (1983), where the court seemed to equate reasonable
foreseeability with proximate cause.
122. See infra text accompanying notes 123 -25.
123. Miller, supra note 70.
124. Diamond, supra note 70.
125. Ingber, supra note 70.
126. Professor Miller suggests that intermediate means of limiting damages, such as imposing
dollar limits on total awards or upon amounts recoverable for pain and suffering, or limiting
awards for pain and suffering to a percentage of tangible economic losses, would be inappropriate
for judicial adoption. This is because all would involve drawing arbitrary lines involving dollar
figures or percentages. Miller, supra note 70, at 39.
127. Professor Diamond suggests that foreseeability would be the standard for determining
liability. Diamond, supra note 70, at 502.
128. Miller, supra note 70, at 40.
129. Id.
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The proposal contemplates that persons who have suffered emotional
distress without incurring out-of-pocket loss would recover nothing. 130
One obvious objection to this proposal is that allowing an action for
an intangible injury like mental distress and at the same time restrict-
ing damages to economic loss is completely inconsistent.13 1 Professor
Miller meets this objection, arguing that both reason and policy sup-
port his view. He believes that many traumatic neuroses would result
in out-of-pocket losses, if only in the sense of psychiatric care.132 The
proposal's exclusion of persons who have not incurred economic loss is
not distressing to its proponents because they recognize that complete
protection from all mental stress is infeasible. 133
Professor Ingber further bolsters the argument in favor of limiting
emotional distress claims through restricting damages by observing
that because first-party insurance13 1 is neither available nor in demand
for emotional distress or pain and suffering, the public does not view
these damages as essential to just compensation. 3 5 In addition, Pro-
fessor Ingber argues that, from the standpoint of restitutive justice, 3 6
awards of non-pecuniary losses are not a necessity. Given the predom-
inance of loss distribution by insurance, restitutive justice in tort law
consists mostly of "marking the tortfeasor as a wrongdoer." Accord-
ing to Ingber, this can be accomplished fully, at least in cases of simple
negligence, by limiting the tortfeasor's liability to pecuniary costs. 137
Both Professors Miller and Ingber would allow general damages to
130. Professor Diamond would extend this thesis to causes of action for loss of consortium
and parent-and-child society claims as well. Diamond, supra note 70, at 480.
131. Emotional injury does not manifest itself in the same way as a physical wound, which
can often require medical attention and impair the ability of the plaintiff to attend work. While
persons suffering from severe emotional distress may benefit from medical attention, they may
not seek it. They may attend work as usual, though functioning at a lower level than than
normal. Despite an ability to earn money, their lives may become dominated by the severe
emotional distress they have suffered. If these individuals recover only for pecuniary loss, the
law will be ignoring the most substantial portion of their injury. For a discussion of the types of
injuries that may result from debilitating emotional distress, see Nolan & Ursin, supra note 70, at
615-19.
132. Miller, supra note 70, at 40.
133. Id
134. First party insurance is insurance purchased by an insured to protect the insured's own
property or person. M. FRANKLIN & R. RABIN, supra note 67, at 638.
135. Ingber, supra note 70, at 785.
136. Restitutive justice is used as a synonym for corrective justice, and focuses on "the
relative distributional positions of wrongdoer and victim before and after a breach of societally
fostered expectations or entitlements." Id at 789 n.82; see also Fried, Is Liberty Possible?, in 3
THE TANNER LECrURES ON HUMAN VALUES 91, 120-21 (S. McMurrin ed. 1982).
137. Ingber, supra note 70, at 791.
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promote deterrence or to encourage primary cost avoidance when the
wrongdoer acts wilfully.13
8
Finally, evaluating the proposal from the standpoint of tertiary cost
avoidance,139 Professor Ingber considers whether substantial elimina-
tion of general damages1" would impair the financial ability of injured
parties to sue and the willingness of insurance companies to settle
claims fairly. One of his conclusions is that unavailability of general
damages would adversely impair plaintiffs' recoveries because the gen-
eral damages would no longer be available to pay attorneys' fees.141
Professor Ingber urges re-examination of the American reluctance to
award fees as a means of overcoming this shortcoming in the propo-
sal. 42 With regard to settlement incentives, Professor Ingber's con-
clusion is that where liability is clear, insurance companies will not
hesitate to settle with plaintiffs and that plaintiffs need not accept a
settlement offer for less than their pecuniary loss. 43 However, when
liability is unclear or plaintiffs needs are pressing, an insurer may
refuse to pay pecuniary losses or attempt to discount them by the
probability of success. 1" Professor Ingber therefore recommends the
institution of a fixed surcharge above awarded damages if the defend-
ant had previously rejected a settlement offer equal to or less than the
judgment rendered at trial. 45
Courts have not been enthusiastic in embracing these types of reme-
dial limitations. Although courts have adopted remedial limitations in
the context of actions for wrongful birth' and, to a limited extent, in
the area of defamation, 47 the concept has not gained adherents in the
138. Miller, supra note 70, at 23-27; Ingber, supra note 70, at 809.
139. Tertiary costs are the transaction costs of redressing accidents. See supra note 81.
140. By general damages, Professor Ingber refers to money awarded by the jury to
compensate for the intangible injury of emotional distress. Ingber, supra note 70, at 811.
141. Id.
142. Id at 811-12.
143. Id at 813. This would not hold true, he acknowledges, if the plaintiffs require




146. Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1982); Harbeson v.
Parke-Davis, Inc., 98 Wash. 2d 460, 646 P.2d 483 (1983). In Turpin, the claim in issue was that
of a child who was born deaf. She sought general and special damages for both the costs
associated with her disability and the pain and suffering of being born deaf and of having to live
with the disability. The court viewed the intangibility of the general damages claim, as well as
the social policy issues involved in measuring pain and suffering of a person whose only other
alternative was never to have been born, as requiring a limitation of damages. Turpin, 643 P.2d
at 961--64, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 344-47.
147. See Gertz v. Robert Welch Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). The Court held that a private
plaintiff who can prove only that the defendant acted negligently with regard to truth or falsity of
Vol. 67:1, 1992
Direct Actions for Emotional Harm
context of claims for pain and suffering, mental distress, or loss of
consortium. The proposal's sweeping dimensions, and its dependence
on modification of well-ingrained settlement and attorneys' fees prac-
tices would certainly lead judges to question the propriety of non-legis-
'lative adoption of this solution to the problems posed by negligent
infliction of emotional distress actions. This is the most important
barrier to its adoption. In addition, while the proposal offers a wel-
come respite from the fractured duty decisions attorneys have been
forced to deal with, it nonetheless seems rather ironic to condition
recovery for an admittedly intangible injury on proof of economic
loss.148 Despite the assertion that serious traumatic stress will often
result in a plaintiff incurring pecuniary losses, there is little reason to
think that this is always true; given the stigma still attached to treat-
ment of mental disorders, many individuals may be reluctant to seek
substantial medical treatment. Further, if plaintiffs seek restitutive
justice by bringing lawsuits, they will have incentives to run up medi-
cal bills in order to gain leverage in the litigation process.14 9 In this
regard, the solution is no better than the current state of affairs, and
would, at least hypothetically, encompass many more claimants. 150
The wide range of proposals for change discussed above reveals both
that the rules governing actionability of direct actions for emotional
harm have provoked serious criticism, and that effectuating positive
change is not easy. Section IV of this Article develops a potential
compromise suggested by the California Supreme Court in Marlene F.
v. Affiliated Psychiatric Medical Clinic, Inc. 51
IV. IS THERE A BETTER WAY TO RESTRUCTURE THE
RULES?
This Article suggests that while the basic policy rationales support-
ing recognition of a limited duty to avoid negligent infliction of emo-
the statement made may recover only actual damages, whereas a plaintiff who can establish
constitutional malice may recover presumed and punitive damages. It is important to note,
however, that actual injury damages may encompass humiliation and mental distress caused by
the defamatory statement. Ma at 350.
148. As Professor Pearson points out, these proposals require courts to ignore the emotional
character of the injury and to agree that recovery should turn solely on economic loss. Professor
Pearson believes courts will be reluctant to focus only on the existence of pecuniary losses.
Pearson, Liability to Bystanders suprc note 70, at 513.
149. Otherwise, their pecuniary losses will be too small to merit litigation of the claim. This
elimination of claims from the courts can be viewed as a positive aspect of the proposal only if
one assumes that claims with small pecuniary losses tend to be trivial claims. See id. at 512.
150. But see id. at 512 n.195 (arguing that Professor Miller's proposal would lead to fewer
cases being pursued because small claims will not be worth litigating).
151. 48 Cal. 3d. 583, 770 P.2d 278, 257 Cal. Rptr. 98 (1989).
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tional distress are valid, the legal rules adopted to implement these
goals are not particularly effective."5 2 In the context of "direct"
actions in particular, use of a "pure foreseeability" standard provides
no assurance that liability will retain any sense of proportion to
fault.153 Furthermore, the concept of "foreseeability" provides judges'
with no guidance as to which claims ought to be deemed actionable.
The zone-of-danger rule, in contrast, limits claims rigidly and consist-
ently, but does so in a manner that mechanically excludes certain
claims that stand on equal footing with those for which recovery is
permitted. 154
This section considers whether it would be possible to determine the
appropriate class of plaintiffs in a "direct" action by utilizing some of
the same duty principles that would apply in cases presenting tangible
injury to persons and property.' 55 This approach was suggested by the
California Supreme Court in Marlene F as an apparent compromise
between application of the zone-of-danger rule and a foreseeability-
plus-serious-injury standard. The California Supzeme Court appar-
ently believes that by requiring a plaintiff to establish duty under cer-
tain specific and concrete rules, the cases that are recognized as
actionable will establish both predictable limits amd proportionality
between fault and liability in a way that a "pure foreseeability" stan-
dard cannot. If the court's analysis in Marlene F indeed constitutes a
compromise between the two predominant legal rules, it should be rel-
evant to courts in zone-of-danger jurisdictions as well. This relevance
stems from the fact that the court in Marlene F appeared to rely heav-
ily on the philosophy underlying the zone-of-danger rule while at the
same time expanding the scope of liability so as to eliminate the rigid-
ity and arbitrariness that characterize the zone-of-danger rule.156
Subsection A explains the origins of this potential compromise by
examining at greater length the California Supreme Court's decision in
Marlene F and identifies the duty principles that courts would utilize
152. See supra text accompanying notes 96-114.
153. Indeed, it is virtually impossible to even contemplate the concept of proportionality of
fault unless one considers some criterion other than foreseeability of harm. See supra text
accompanying notes 113-14.
154. See supra text accompanying notes 108-10.
155. Justice Grodin considered (without endorsing) this possibility in his concurrence to
Ochoa v. Superior Court, 39 Cal. 3d 159, 703 P.2d 1, 14, 216 Cal. Rptr. 661, 674 (1985). Under
Justice Grodin's statement of this approach, the plaintiff would need to establish negligence,
foreseeability and proximate cause. Id. As this section reveals, it would be possible to premise
the existence of duty on much narrower criteria than foreseeability, while still giving credence to
many of the accepted bases for finding a duty to exist in cases presenting tangible personal injury
or property damage.
156. See infra text accompanying notes 176-89.
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in place of the current rules. Subsection B demonstrates how this
approach would apply in some prototypical cases. Subsection C evalu-
ates whether there would be a need for proof of serious and genuine
injury or physical manifestations of harm if direct actions are treated
like negligence claims based on personal injury or property damage.
Subsection D assesses the benefits and shortcomings of such an
analysis.
A. The Analysis Suggested by Marlene F.
In Marlene F. v. Affiliated Psychiatric Medical Clinic, Inc.,157 the
California Supreme Court was presented with the case of a mother
who had sought counseling for herself and for her son. When the ther-
apist molested the boy, Marlene F. sought to recover damages arising
from her emotional distress. Despite the purely emotional character
of Marlene F.'s harm, the court stated that because negligent infliction
of emotional distress is a part of the fabric of all negligence law and
not an independent tort theory, the "traditional elements" of the cause
of action for negligence apply. 158 This statement was a rather remark-
able departure from the framework most courts and scholars have
come to visualize in cases involving pure emotional harm. Although
courts clearly recognize the kinship between cases involving pure emo-
tional harm and "ordinary" negligence cases in which the damage
incurred consists of personal injury or property damage, they consist-
ently utilize a separate and more limiting set of rules in cases present-
ing pure emotional harm because they believe that any other course
would lead to unlimited liability.15 9
The California Supreme Court is not the only court to suggest that
emotional distress cases might be decided based on the rules applicable
in tort actions involving personal injury or property damage. Yet
most often, courts consider foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff to be
the unifying standard."6 The California Supreme Court's opinion in
157. 48 Cal. 3d 583, 770 P.2d 278, 257 Cal. Rptr. 98 (1989).
158. Marlene F, 770 P.2d at 281, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 101.
159. The rules discussed in Section II of this Article exemplify the special rules that have
evolved for the specific purpose of governing cases in which damages result from emotional
harm. Similarly, a subset of rules has evolved to govern cases involving pure economic harm, at
least where the negligent acts in issue pose a danger of widespread liability. See generally Rabin,
supra note 35. Most textbooks on tort law place cases involving pure emotional and pure
economic harm in discrete sections of the casebook, reflecting the notion that the cases present
unique policy. See, eg., D. DOBBs, Torts and Compensation, Personal Accountability and Social
Responsibility fox Injury 366-94, 830-906 (1985); M. FRANKLIN & R. RABIN, supra note 67, at
284-370.
160. See, ag., Ochoa v. Superior Court, 39 Cal. 2d 196, 703 P.2d 1, 27, 216 Cal. Rptr. 661,
687 (Bird, J., concurring and dissenting); Rodrigues v. State, 52 Haw. 156, 472 P.2d 509 (1970),
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Marlene F identifies foreseeability as a threshold requirement, but
states that the existence of duty would depend on far more specific
criteria-relationships justifying the imposition of duty, assumption of
duty by a defendant, or legally imposed duties. 161 The following sub-
section examines the Marlene F. opinion in more detail as a means of
identifying the duty rules a court could utilize to re-integrate direct
actions for emotional distress into the structure of negligence law
generally.
1. Identifying the Duty Principles That Would Govern Direct
Actions
The majority opinion in Marlene F is particularly notable both
because the court moves away from a legal analysis that focuses on
cases involving pure emotional harm as a separate species of claim and
also because the court appears to disavow the broad foreseeability lan-
guage of its decision in Molien. The substantive portion of the opinion
begins with the assertion that "[t]he negligent causing of emotional
distress is not an independent tort but the tort of negligence."' 62 The
court then stated that, in general, the existence of a duty in tort
depends upon the foreseeability of the risk and upon a weighing of
policy considerations for and against imposition of liability.' 63 View-
ing the landmark cases of Dillon and Molien in this context, the court
stressed that in each, foreseeability of the injury was "but the thresh-
old element."' 64 The court explained that the key to Dillon was not
foreseeability, but the identification of a number of factors designed to
"exclud[e] the remote and unexpected.' 1 65  The Molien opinion,
despite its repeated references to foreseeability, "did not... purport to
create a cause of action for the negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress based solely upon the foreseeability that serious emotional dis-
tress might result." 166
Drawing on traditional common law principles, the court asserted
that "[d]amages for severe emotional distress... are recoverable in a
and subsequent Hawaii cases, supra note 52; McLoughlin v. O'Brign, 2 All E.R. 298 (1982)
(holding that in bystander cases a defendant's duty must depend on reasonable foreseeability).
161. Marlene F., 770 P.2d at 280-82, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 100-02.
162. Id. at 281, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 101 (emphasis in original) (quoting 6 WmuIN, SUMMARY
oF CALIFoRNiA LAW § 838 (9th ed. 1988)). The text of the passage cited indicates that Witkin
meant that the same duty and causation issues apply. Numerous other legal issues are also
shared, including analysis of breach and defenses.
163. Marlene F., 770 P.2d at 281, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 101.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id at 281, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 102.
Vol. 67:1, 1992
Direct Actions for Emotional Harm
negligence action when they result from the breach of a duty owed the
plaintiff that is assumed by the defendant or imposed on the defendant
as a matter of law, or that arises out of a relationship between the
two." '167 In the majority's view, the court's opinion in Molien
acknowledged these rules as the basis for the duty recognized by
emphasizing the fact that the doctor who negligently misdiagnosed
Mrs. Molien as having a sexually transmitted disease assumed a duty
to convey accurate information to Mr. Molien. 168 This assumption of
duty arose from the doctor's direction that the husband be told of a
diagnosis "that foreseeably would disrupt the marital relationship and
require the husband to be physically examined."' 69 Viewing the claim
of Marlene F. in this context, the majority found the allegations in the
complaint sufficient because they asserted that the defendant "under-
took to treat both [mother and son] for their intra-family difficulties by
providing psychotherapy to both."' 170 In other words, the majority
found that the therapist's abuse of the therapeutic relationship and
molestation of the boy could be considered a breach of his duty of care
to the mother as well as to the son.
Although the majority's analysis was premised on the existence of
the doctor/patient relationship with the mother of the molested child,
the majority noted that it was also foreseeable that a mother who con-
sults a therapist "for the purpose of stabilizing and improving her rela-
tionship with her son, and who commits herself and her son to the
therapist's care, would feel betrayed and suffer emotional distress upon
learning that the therapist had, during the course of the treatment,
167. IM The court's reference to duty imposed by law appears to refer to the court's
willingness to recognize the existence of a duty even to persons who may seem "collateral" if
other decisions indicate that this course is correct as a matter of social policy. For example, in
Tarasotf v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976),
the California Supreme Court recognized the duty of a psychotherapist treating a patient who
was predicted to injure a third party to warn the potential victim of the danger. Subsequent case
law has recognized a legal entitlement on the part of the potential victim that would extend even
to emotional harm. See Hedlund v. Superior Court, 34 Cal. 3d 695, 669 P.2d 41, 194 Cal. Rptr.
805 (1983). Statutes may be interpreted as imposing the duty as well. See Pintor v. Ong, 211
Cal. App. 3d 837, 259 Cal. Rptr. 577 (1989) (Civil Code § 2941 permits homeowner, upon
satisfaction of the obligation secured by deed of trust, to recover damages for emotional distress
based on defendants' failure to reconvey); Young v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n,
141 Cal. App. 3d 108, 190 Cal. Rptr. 122 (1983) (credit issuer's wilful violation of Civil Code
§ 1747 et seq. entitles credit cardholder to compensation of emotional distress damages).
168. Marlene F., 770 P.2d at 282, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 102. The court also suggested that a duty
might have been imposed by law even if the doctor had not assumed it. Id. at n.5. The court was
referring to well-established rules that impose liability on a doctor to persons infected by his
patient if he fails to diagnose a contagious disease or, having diagnosed the disease, fails to warn
members of the patient's family. Id.
169. Id. at 282, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 102.
170. Id.
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sexually molested her son." 171 The majority's observation about fore-
seeability of harm to the plaintiff appears almost as an afterthought,
leaving the reader to wonder about its significance as a determinant of
duty.
A concurring opinion, joined by two justices, 172 accused the major-
ity of perpetuating the misperception that negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress is a separate cause of action.173 The concurring justices
believed that Marlene F.'s claim was one of professional malpractice
and that the duty element was easily satisfied by the facts establishing
the doctor/patient relationship. 74 Accordingly, the concurring jus-
tices saw Molien as completely irrelevant to the pending action.
The majority and concurring opinions in Marlene F. create many
more questions than they answer. If both groups ofjustices viewed the
existence of a doctor/patient relationship as the basis for recognition
of a duty in tort, it is difficult to ascertain any substantive differences
between their opinions. Also, both opinions mention foreseeability
without any explicit explanation of what role it plays. 17 In addition,
neither opinion considers any of the ramifications of its decision; the
opinions provide no clue as to whether the justices iewed the recovery
of mental distress at issue in Marlene F. as a limited occurrence based
on the peculiar risk of emotional harm created by the psychotherapeu-
tic relationship, or whether the justices would be willing to consider
emotional harm as a cognizable injury in any case in which a relation-
ship exists creating a legal duty. The following sub-sections explore
the significance of these unanswered questions.
171. Id at 283, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 103.
172. The concurring opinion I refer to was written by Justice Eagleson and joined by Justices
Lucas and Panelli. Id. at 288-89, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 108-09. Another concurring opinion,
written by Justice Arguelles, argues in favor of a limited expansion of the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress and is not directly relevant to the points being discussed here.
173. Id at 288, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 103. Justice Eagleson states that although the majority had
purported to deny the existence of a separate cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional
distress, the majority's reliance on Molien perpetuates the misperception.
174. Id
175. The majority opinion focuses on foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, whereas the
concurring justices seem to emphasize the foreseeability that the therapist's misconduct would
inhibit successful treatment of the plaintiff. Id at 287, 289, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 107, 109 (Arguelles,
J., & Eagleson, J., concurring). The significance of this distinction is somewhat unclear. The
concurring justices, viewing the case as one of professional malpractice, may be utilizing
foreseeability of emotional distress to the plaintiff to satisfy a proximate cause requirement.
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2. Placing the Court's Opinion in Marlene F. Within the Context of
Recognized Duty Principles
As the court in Marlene F. acknowledged, all duty rules are merely
an expression of some underlying policy determination that a defend-
ant is under a legal obligation to a plaintiff.176 As duty rules have
developed, 77 courts have come to recognize a nearly universal duty to
avoid creation of an unreasonable risk of tangible personal injury or
property damage to others.1 7 8 More specific rules are often articulated
as well. For example, duty has also been found to exist when a defend-
ant voluntarily undertakes an obligation to a plaintiff by affirmative
conduct.1 79 Even when a defendant has neither undertaken to act nor
created a risk of harm, a duty may exist by virtue of a relationship
between plaintiff and defendant.1 0 Recognition of a special relation-
ship between plaintiff and defendant has resulted in requiring a
defendant to aid, warn and protect a plaintiff from third persons.'
Courts consider special relationships as important indicia of the fair-
ness of recognizing the existence of a duty even in cases that do not
raise the traditional nonfeasance issues.18 2
In addition to these long-standing duty rules, some courts have
developed an approach to duty questions that entails the balancing of
176. Id at 281, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 101. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 20, § 53 (general
discussion of duty as an element of negligence). The contrary view is expressed by Professor
Abel, who asserts that duty is an incoherent doctrine and should be eliminated except in the
context of determining obligations to help those at risk. Abel, supra note 21, at 826.
177. The element of duty emerged as the law of negligence developed. As courts began to
view negligence as a failure to perform a legal duty, they began to focus as well on the existence
of the antecedent obligation. HARPER & JAMES, supra note 106, § 18.1.
178. Id. § 18.2. However, even where a defendant by affirmative acts has injured a plaintiff,
the prevailing view is that duty is limited to a class of persons threatened by the defendant's
conduct. See id. ("The obligation to refrain from that particular conduct is owed only to those
who are foreseeably endangered by the conduct and only with respect to those risks or hazards
whose likelihood made the conduct unreasonably dangerous.").
179. This ground for recognition of duty emerged early in the development of the concept of
negligence. Id. § 18.1; see also RESrATEmENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1985) (Negligent
Performance of Undertaking to Render Services).
180. Special relationships are recognized as powerful ties between individuals that require a
defendant to act even when the defendant has not created any risk of harm to the plaintiff.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A (1985).
181. See, ag., id §§ 314A, 315-20.
182. Nonfeasance is the general rule of the common law that one person owes another no
duty to take affirmative steps for another's protection. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314
(1985) illustrates this rule. Under the Restatement, the existence of a special relationship
between the defendant and the plaintiff triggers a duty to take affirmative steps to protect
another. The common law has always recognized the obligation to exercise care when one
creates a risk of harm to another, or engages in "misfeasance." The court in Marlene F.
emphasized the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant notwithstanding the fact that
duty could be found to exist because of an undertaking to act.
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various policy considerations. For example, California courts utilize a
balancing approach in a wide variety of situations, encompassing such
diverse areas as landowner and occupier liability"'3 and liability for
infliction of pure economic harm.'" Although several appellate deci-
sions in California have attempted to utilize this balancing approach in
cases involving negligent infliction of emotional harm, balancing has
not been embraced in that context.
18 5
The majority's reliance on concrete duty rules in Marlene F clearly
embodies a judgment that special relationships and undertakings to
act may give rise to tort liability for emotional distress damages. The
specificity of these rules minimizes the possibility that one negligent
act will result in liability to a long chain of plaintiffis, each of whom is
foreseeably affected by the negligent act in some manner.' 86 Utilized
as the basis for a finding of duty in cases involving pure emotional
harm, these rules respond to concerns about proportionality between
fault and damages by imposing concrete limitations on the class of
plaintiffs permitted to bring suit.
Although the specific duty rules described above embody a societal
judgment that tort liability may be warranted if negligence can be
shown and also constrain liability so as to impose some proportional-
ity, these rules do not address the related policy issues that would arise
in cases involving pure emotional harm. While it is arguable that pro-
portionality between fault and damages and the imposition of some
damage-related requirement 8 7 should satisfy any qualms courts might
have about the actionability of claims for emotional distress, the
courts' experience with these claims suggests that subsidiary issues will
arise. "'88 For example, despite the existence of a special relationship
between an attorney and a client, most courts do not recognize any
right on the part of a client to recover for emotional distress arising
from an attorney's negligence.'8 9 If the existence of a special relation-
183. Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968).
184. Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958).
185. See infra text accompanying notes 209-26.
186. There may be instances in which a defendant's negligence gives rise to a cause of action
for two or more individuals, as was true in Molien. Yet suits by plaintiffs who are collateral to
the negligent act will be greatly reduced because each plaintiff must demonstrate the existence of
a special relationship, an undertaking to act, or a duty otherwise imposed by law.
187. See infra text accompanying notes 227-33.
188. These subsidiary issues consist of discrete policy questions that pertain to a particular
type of case, such as medical or legal malpractice. These policy issue3 persist despite resolution
of the traditionally-held objections to recovery of damages for emotional distress. See infra text
accompanying notes 197-202.
189. See Dorsey v. Purvis, 543 So. 2d 703 (Ala. Civ. App. 1989) (no recovery for emotional
distress where merely negligent discharge of duty); Quezada v. Hart, 67 Cal. App. 3d 754, 136
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ship and proof of serious injury are all that is required to entitle a
plaintiff to state a claim for damages for emotional distress, courts will
need to re-examine their denial of these damages in the context of legal
malpractice in order to determine whether there is some unique policy
reason demanding that result. Accordingly, the analysis set forth in
Marlene F. may be only the first step in the process of deciding
whether to permit claims for emotional harm. Other policy issues will
continue to require resolution at the duty stage, as will be illustrated
through the following analysis of prototypical cases.
B. Prototypical Cases
As discussed above, the compromise position articulated by the Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court in Marlene F. requires that the plaintiff seeking
recovery for pure emotional harm allege, in addition to some form of
foreseeability, (1) the existence of a relationship between plaintiff and
defendant, or (2) an undertaking to act, or (3) that a duty has been
imposed by law. Because the opinion does not demonstrate how this
rule would apply in some of the more problematic emotional distress
cases that arise, this subsection will examine and evaluate several pro-
totypical cases. For purposes of clarity, I have prefaced each proto-
typical case with a statement of the major issue raised.
1. Would Damages for Emotional Distress Be Recoverable Any
Time a Duty Can Be Found Under The Established
Principles Articulated in Marlene F.?
Although the California Supreme Court seemed inclined to narrow
the scope of liability in direct actions for emotional distress when it
decided Marlene F., the rules announced may have in fact expanded
potential recovery. 1" Consider a case in which a physician deviates
Cal. Rptr. 815 (1977) (refusing to allow recovery for emotional distress resulting from an
attorney's negligence). Courts frequently claim that these damages are merely a consequence of
other damages caused by the attorney's negligence. R. MALLEN & J. SMITH, LEGAL
MALPRACTICE § 16.11 (1989). Occasionally, damages for emotional distress are recoverable
when an attorney's misconduct results in loss of liberty. Id; see also Wagenmann v. Adams, 829
F.2d 196 (1st Cir. 1987) (recognizing recovery of damages for emotional harm when client suffers
loss of liberty as a result of malpractice); Holliday v. Jones, 215 Cal. App. 3d 102, 264 Cal. Rptr.
448 (1989) (questioning the validity of the majority rule in light of the abandonment of the
physical injury requirement and concluding that where a client alleges loss of liberty, California
law permits recovery for emotional distress).
190. See, eg., Note, Marlene F. v. Affiliated Psychiatric Medical Clinic, Inc.: Negligent
Infliction of Emotional Distress Bounces Out of Bounds, 22 PAC. L. J. 189, 212 (1990). The
author of this Note argues that, by characterizing the plaintiff in Marlene F. as a direct victim,
the court opened the door to all foreseeable plaintiffs. This argument is based, in part, on the
author's belief that the court's contention that the defendant assumed a duty to the plaintiff was
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from professional custom in the course of performing a particular pro-
cedure, such as amniocentesis. The patient suffers a miscarriage that
is accompanied by severe emotional pain. However, she suffers no
physical harm as a result of the amniocentesis.' 9 '
Most courts faced with the scenario described above would not rec-
ognize a right of the plaintiff to sue the defendant for negligence. One
reason courts refuse to recognize a right of the plaintiff to proceed is
the plaintiff's lack of physical manifestation of emotional distress. 192
However, as more jurisdictions relax the requirement that a plaintiff
prove that she has sustained physical manifestation of injury, the
traditional rationale is considerably weaker, forcing courts to re-evalu-
ate the reasons that they refuse to recognize the right of the plaintiff to
proceed. Some courts justify their refusal to allow the mother to bring
such a suit on the ground that she was not within "the zone of physi-
cal danger."' 93 Other courts might assert that the plaintiff must fulfill
the elements of a bystander cause of action, under either the zone-of-
completely specious and that no duty was imposed by law. Id. at 212-14. Focusing on the
existence of a doctor/patient relationship, the author argues that under Marlene F., a physician
might be liable for emotional distress suffered by one patient when a completely unrelated patient
is injured. Id. at 216. This type of expansion seems unlikely, if only for the reason that both the
majority and the concurring justices stated that, in addition to the existence of a relationship,
there must be some foreseeability of that type of injury to the plaintiff.
191. These facts are derived from Tebbutt v. Virostek, 65 N.Y.2d 931, 483 N.E.2d 1142, 493
N.Y.S.2d 1010 (1985).
192. M. MCCAFFERTY & S. MEYER, MEDICAL MALPRACTIcE, B-AsEs OF LIABILrY § 2.46
(1985) (stating that the majority rule is that mental distress must be accompanied by physical
injury).
193. See eg., Tebbutt 483 N.E.2d at 1143,493 N.Y.S.2d at 1011. The plaintiff brought suit
to recover for emotional harm suffered upon the stillbirth of her child, allegedly caused by
physician's negligence. The court held that defendant owed no duty because 1) plaintiff was not
in the zone of danger in that she did not witness the conduct causing the injury or death, and
2) plaintiff did not fall within the parameters of the duty establishel by Johnson v. State, 37
N.Y.2d 378, 334 N.E.2d 590, 372 N.Y.S.2d 638 (1975); see also Villamil v. Elmhurst Memorial
Hosp., 529 N.E.2d 1181 (Ill. App. 1988) (a mother had no cause of action when newly delivered
baby fell off delivery table, sustaining severe injuries which led to dssth, on grounds that the
mother was not in the zone of physical danger); cf. Green v. Leibowitz, 118 A.D.2d 756, 500
N.Y.S.2d 146 (1986) (rejecting a legal malpractice claim on the ground that even where physical
injury is not a necessary element, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant's breach of duty
unreasonably endangered the plaintiff's physical safety). But see Martinez v. Long Island Jewish
Hillside Medical Center, 70 N.Y.2d 697, 512 N.E.2d 538, 518 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1987) (permitting
woman who underwent abortion on the erroneous advice of doctors that baby would be born
with anencephaly to bring an action for her emotional distress); Ferrara v. Galluchio, 5 N.Y.2d
16, 152 N.E.2d 249, 176 N.Y.S.2d 996 (1958) (recognizing right of plaintiff to recover for fear of
cancer); Martell v. St. Charles Hosp., 137 Misc. 2d 980, 523 N.Y.S.2d 342 (1987) (recognizing
right of patient who alleged that she had sustained emotional injury as a result of physician's
erroneous diagnosis to sue for emotional distress despite fact that physician's actions did not
place her in physical danger).
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danger or Dillon-type rules.194 Given courts' general reluctance to
recognize a right to recover for emotional distress resulting from medi-
cal malpractice, the California Supreme Court's reliance on the exist-
ence of a special relationship as a basis for finding duty to exist may
signal a widespread recognition of a right to bring medical malpractice
actions when severe emotional distress is suffered. For that matter, if
special relationships open the courthouse doors, many other emotional
distress cases may be brought as well, so long as they arise out of rela-
tionships of trust and dependence. It is possible, of course, to read
Marlene F more narrowly, limiting the court's holding to cases in
which a patient undergoes treatment that places her at a peculiar risk
of emotional harm. 195 Such an interpretation would lead to damages
awards in cases in which traditional physical injury is not a possibility,
as would be the case with any psychological, psychiatric or spiritual
counseling. 196
Despite the possibility that Marlene F could be interpreted nar-
rowly, the majority's heavy reliance on special relationships, undertak-
ings to act, and duties imposed by law seems to indicate that the
holding was intended to affect all direct actions for emotional distress.
The California Supreme Court seems to suggest that use of the specific
and concrete principles enumerated-the very same rules applied in
194. This approach was criticized by a California appellate court in Johnson v. Superior
Court, 123 Cal. App. 3d 1002, 177 Cal. Rptr. 63 (1981). In recognizing a mother's right to
recover for emotional distress suffered as a result of the stillbirth of a child, the court stated:
The solution to the problem lies not in contorting Dillon to cover a situation which it was
not designed to fit, but in recognizing that the emotional distress arising from the sensory
impact of the death of the child is compensable as part of the mother's cause of action for
malpractice to herself.
Johnson, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 65; see also Sesma v. Cueto, 129 Cal. App. 3d 108, 181 Cal. Rptr. 12
(1982). In Sesma, the appellate court reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment for
the defendant in a case in which the plaintiff suffered distress stemming from medical malpractice
that resulted in the stillbirth of her baby. The trial court had held that Mrs. Sesma failed to meet
the Dillon requirements, but the appellate court reversed, stating that Mrs. Sesma could sustain
an action in her own right, based on the emotional distress she suffered as a result of medical
neglect during labor.
195. Justice Eagleson's concurring opinion raises the possibility of this narrow interpretation.
He states, "When a professional relationship involves counseling or therapy for the purpose of
treating an emotional or psychiatric condition, the right to recover for malpractice which
worsens that condition and in so doing causes severe emotional distress is clear." Marlene F. v.
Affiliated Psychiatric Med. Clinic, Inc., 48 Cal. 3d 583, 770 P.2d 278, 289, 257 Cal. Rptr. 98, 109
(1989).
196. It stands to reason that in cases in which one's psyche is being treated, the emotional
aspect of one's being is placed at risk when a professional is negligent. Unless recovery for
emotional distress is made available, there will be little deterrence of negligent acts, and no
compensation for most injuries. Even psychiatrists, however, prefer to deal with emotional harm
in the context of physical injury. See Seizer, Psychic Disabilities Following Trauma, LEGAL MED.
ANN. 389 (C. Wecht ed. 1970).
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cases involving traditional injuries-will achieve the proper balance
between compensation of injuries and proportionate liability. If the
California Supreme Court has indeed embraced this reasoning, the
result in the negligent amniocentesis case described above ought to be
that the plaintiff will be permitted to proceed with a negligence action.
The relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant provides a
sensible and tangible basis for recognition of a duty and the scope of
the defendant's liability will be subject to finite limits despite the emo-
tional character of the injury.
Nonetheless, it is difficult to imagine most courts endorsing free
availability of emotional distress damages in all cases in which a spe-
cial relationship exists, even if the injury is severe.1 97 Even if courts
are not concerned about disproportionality between fault and liability
or fraudulent claims, various types of cases will present additional pol-
icy considerations. For example, in the prototypical case of medical
malpractice, courts might consider whether recognition of a right to
recover damages caused by emotional distress would seriously impair
the delivery of services by raising insurance costs. 198 In the context of
197. This has been the case in which plaintiffs have sought recovery for "cancerphobia," a
fear of contracting cancer in the future due to negligently caused present exposure to cancer-
causing substances. Although New York recognized the validity of a cancerphobia claim in
Ferrara v. Galluchio, 5 N.Y.2d 16, 152 N.E.2d 249, 170 N.Y.S.2d 996 (1958), there is wide
disagreement over the compensability of this type of emotional injury. While courts have been
inclined to allow recovery when the claim is parasitic to some condition they can identify as an
existing injury, see Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988), certain courts
are extremely hesitant when physical harm is absent, see Payton v. Abbott Labs, 386 Mass. 540,
437 N.E.2d 171 (1982) (rejecting claims of DES daughters in the absence of evidence of physical
harm).
Thus, even if a relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant affords a guarantee of
proportionality and the plaintiff alleges severe injury, courts may still be hesitant because they
view the injury as contingent. For example, in Khan v. Shiley Inc., 217 Cal. App. 3d 848, 266
Cal. Rptr. 106 (1990), a California appellate court affirmed the granting of summary judgment
for the defendant where the plaintiff alleged emotional distress as a result of implantation of an
artificial heart valve known to be subject to recall due to a propensity to fracture. Although the
court conceded that emotional injuries might be recoverable as part of a products liability claim,
it refused to acknowledge the validity of a products claim until the valve ceased functioning. In
essence, the court believed that the emotional distress the plaintiff alleged did not constitute a
present injury. But see Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 225 Cal. App. 3d 213, 274 Cal.
Rptr. 885 (1990) (recognizing negligent infliction of emotional distress action based on plaintiff's
exposure to negligently dumped toxics, despite the absence of any present symptoms of cancer).
198. Medical malpractice reforms have led to legislative restrictions on pain and suffering in
medical malpractice cases. It is possible that where a state has placed tight limits on recovery for
pain and suffering, courts might infer that state policy would be against recovery of damages for
emotional distress. One would not think this determination would be made without substantial
evidence that it reflects state policy, and it seems unlikely that damages caps ought to lead a
court to infer that no actions for emotional distress will be permitt:d. Most states that have
attempted to address the rising costs of health care caused by medical malpractice liability have
resorted only to limits on intangible damages. See, eg., CAL. Civ. Pr.oc. CODE § 3333.2 (1991)
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actions for legal malpractice, where the only injury is emotional or the
emotional component is so dominant that it cannot be recognized as
parasitic to some sort of property damage, courts must determine
whether the existence of a special relationship and an undertaking to
act should suffice to make the emotional distress damages cogniza-
ble.199 Another policy issue that might be taken into account is
whether the existence of a duty in a particular type of case is inconsis-
tent with treatment of a related injury in a slightly different context.
For example, in the negligent amniocentesis case from which the
example utilized above is drawn, both the majority and the dissenting
judges recognized the need to ascertain the relationship between the
rule pertaining to negligent infliction of emotional distress and actions
for wrongful death of an unborn fetus.2°° The majority found that the
case law reflected a broad rule precluding parental recovery for emo-
tional distress stemming from injuries occurring to a fetus in utero,
and found this concern also reflected in a rule that no action for
wrongful death could be maintained by the representative of a still-
born fetus.201 The dissent argued that, under precedent and logic, the
New York rule prohibiting actions for wrongful death did not in any
sense preclude actions for a mother's emotional distress.2 '2
In sum, it is possible that even the concrete rules referred to by the
Court in Marlene F. will lead to an increase in the number of suits
brought for damages arising from emotional distress. However, even
if the traditional policy concerns regarding actions for emotional dis-
tress are satisfied, courts will likely address other policy reasons that
may militate against liability for these damages in particular contexts.
(limiting recovery for non-economic losses to $250,000); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3407 (1990)
(overall cap of $1 million on damages with non-economic damages capped at $250,000); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 583.010 (1988) ($350,000 limit on non-economic damage recovery).
199. Such a determination would change the nature of legal malpractice recovery. Mallen
and Smith, in their treatise on legal malpractice, state that in most instances, emotional damages
are viewed as consequential to other damages caused by an attorney's malpractice and, hence, are
not recoverable. R. MALLEN & J. SMrIH, supra note 189, § 16.11. Thus, these cases often are
not perceived as pure emotional harm cases, even though they are treated the same as if
emotional harm were the only injury. The question of whether legal malpractice cases are so
unique that emotional distress damages should not be cognizable is beyond the scope of this
Article. The point is that if relationships and undertakings to act make these damages
cognizable, courts should articulate some policy justification if they are not to be recoverable in
legal malpractice cases. Mallen and Smith assert that treatment of these injuries "should
comport with the jurisdictional rules applicable to ordinary tort actions." Id.
200. Tebbutt v. Virostek, 65 N.Y.2d 931, 483 N.E.2d 1142, 493 N.Y.S.2d 1010 (1985).
201. Tebbutt, 483 N.E.2d at 1144, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 1012 (Jasen, J., dissenting).
202. Id. at 1145-49, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 1012-17.
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2. Would Established Duty Rules Other Than Those Specifically
Mentioned in Marlene F. Suffice to Create an Obligation
Warranting Recognition of a Right to Recover
Damages Stemming from Emotional
Distress?
Suppose that the plaintiffs in a given case are passengers in an aerial
tram. A large piece of machinery part falls through the glass roof,
immobilizing the vehicle and severely traumatizing the plaintiffs. One
passenger is killed. The plaintiffs seek recovery for serious emotional
distress suffered because of their fears for their own safety.20 3 In
another case, a negligent driver narrowly misses :hitting the plaintiff
pedestrian, causing serious resulting injuries stemming from emotional
shock.
In both of these cases, recovery for emotional distress would be
available to the plaintiff in zone-of-danger jurisdictions. The facts
embody the geographic proximity and threat of physical harm that are
the essence of the zone-of-danger rule. In California, prior to Marlene
F, the basis for recovery appears uncertain. Certainly California had
recognized the existence of a legal duty in early oases,2' but in the
years following Dillon and Molien, appellate decisions did not reflect
much thought about whether this kind of case constituted a "direct
action." 20 5
The California Supreme Court's limited references to the accepted
bases for duty in Marlene F raise a legitimate question about whether
recovery will be permitted when a plaintiff is within the zone of physi-
cal danger. Certainly one could argue, in keeping with Marlene F,
that exposure of a plaintiff to a risk of physical harm in a tram owned
by the defendant constitutes an assumption of duty, or that a special
relationship exists. However, one intermediate appellate court charac-
terized the defendant's conduct as creation of a risk of physical harm
to the plaintiffs and concluded that duty would eidst under the zone-
203. This example is based on the facts in Ballinger v. Palm Springs Aerial Tramway, 220
Cal. App. 3d 581, 269 Cal. Rptr. 583 (1989).
204. California law appeared to allow recovery if fright resulted in physical injury or illness.
See B. WrrKIN, 6 SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW § 839 (9th ed. 1987) (citing Medeiros v.
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 57 Cal. App. 2d 707, 135 P.2d 676 (1943) (nausea and sickness resulting
from discovery of disgusting object in bottled beverage) and Cook v. Maier, 33 Cal. App. 2d 581,
92 P.2d 434 (1939) (auto collision on plaintiff's land caused her to fear for her own safety)).
205. The major cases addressing tort liability on "direct victim" theory, such as Molien, have
addressed the more difficult factual questions of when plaintiffs who were in some sense collateral
to an injury negligently inficted on another person could recover.
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of-danger rule.2 "6 In the case of a negligent automobile driver, the
most logical basis for finding the existence of a duty is the defendant's
creation of a risk of physical harm to the plaintiff. There is arguably
no special relationship or assumption of a duty.
It seems likely that even if no special relationship or assumption of
duty can be found, California courts applying Marlene F. would likely
find that a duty exists. Any other result would indicate that Califor-
nia's rules are more restrictive than those in zone-of-danger jurisdic-
tions, an unlikely result given the court's silence on the issue. If
recovery may be premised on presence within a zone of physical risk,
California's compromise position may recognize the availability of
damages for emotional harm in virtually any situation in which some
well-established duty rule other than general foreseeability would indi-
cate the existence of a legal obligation between the plaintiff and the
defendant. Certainly presence within the zone of physical danger
would constitute a concrete and well-established basis for recovery.
3. Would Damages for Emotional Distress Be Recoverable in Cases
Where No Established Duty Rules Apply?
The last prototypical case presents the most difficult issues posed
thus far. A child is terribly injured as a result of medical malpractice.
While the child may bring his or her own action for damages, the
child's parents seek to recover for the emotional trauma they will suf-
fer as a result of confronting and accepting the injury.207 In this type
of case, a duty to the parents would not exist by virtue of a special
relationship, an undertaking to act, creation of a risk of bodily harm or
206. See, ag., Ballinger, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 588 (1990). In Ballinger, the court recognized the
long-standing rule that one who is within the zone of danger and who suffers emotional trauma
out of fear for their own safety may pursue an action against the defendant, and stated that
rejection of the zone-of-danger rule in the context of bystander recovery did not affect actions
that are not based on the theory that a percipient witness of negligence to another ought to be
permitted to recover for emotional distress suffered. Confusingly, the court then attempted, in
the alternative, to justify the existence of a duty on the "direct victim" language of Molien,
arguing that there can be "no question that defendants' negligence which resulted in a piece of
the tramway system crashing through the glass roof of the tram car was 'by its very nature
directed at' all passengers in the tram." Id.a at 589.
207. This type of damage appears virtually indistinguishable from the type of damages often
sought in actions for loss of a child's companionship. Although at common law a father was
entitled to recover for loss of services or earning capacity of a child, this recovery did not
traditionally include intangible losses of consortium. Today, few jurisdictions recognize the
validity of actions for loss of a child's companionship. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 20,
§ 125. However, in 1975, Wisconsin allowed parents of a newborn infant who was allegedly
blinded as a result of medical malpractice to state a cause of action for loss of society, on the
condition that their cause of action be brought in combination with that of the child for personal
injury. Shockley v. Prier, 66 Wis. 2d 394, 225 N.W.2d 495 (1975); see also Love, Tortious
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any other established duty rule. Nonetheless, plaintiffs urge that,
based on a balancing of various policy considerations, courts should
recognize the existence of a duty. As noted above,2" 8 the overt balanc-
ing of policy considerations is well-recognized as a process for deter-
mining the existence of duty in some jurisdictions, particularly
California. Most courts, however, have refrained from a balancing
analysis in cases seeking recovery for emotional distress.
Two California appellate decisions, however, have utilized policy-
balancing to determine the existence of a duty to avoid infliction of
emotional harm, and are therefore useful to demonstrate potential pit-
falls." 9  In Andalon v. Superior Court21° the parents of a child
afflicted with Down's Syndrome brought an action for negligent inflic-
tion of emotional harm against the doctor who had. provided pre-natal
care to the mother and had failed to advise her of the risk of Down's
Syndrome. The major issue on appeal was whether the parents should
be allowed to recover for emotional distress under the Molien direct
victim theory. Dissatisfied with the amorphous foreseeability stan-
dard, two out of the three judges on the panel argued that the action
ought to be viewed simply as one involving medical malpractice2 1
and that duty ought to be determined by the well-known policy
calculus of Biakanja v. Irving."2 In Biakanja, a case involving the
negligent infliction of pure economic harm, the court emphasized con-
sideration of the extent to which the defendant's conduct was intended
to affect the plaintiff.2" 3 Weighing this criterion heavily, the Andalon
court found that because of the contractual relationship between the
Interference with the Parent-Child Relationship: Loss of an Injured Person's Society and
Companionship, 51 IND. L.J. 590 (1976) (arguing that such actions should be recognized).
The fact that parents may seek to utilize direct actions for emotional distress to circumvent the
prohibition on actions for loss of a child's companionship suggests that courts must analyze the
substance of each claim presented rather than the name given to the cause of action.
208. See supra text accompanying notes 183-85.
209. The California Supreme Court in Marlene F. did not consider the validity of the theories
advanced by the appellate decisions discussed here. The court did not see a need to reach the
issues raised. Marlene F. v. Affiliated Psychiatric Med. Clinic, Inc., 48 Cal. 3d 583, 770 P.2d
278, 283, 257 Cal. Rptr. 98, 103 (1989).
210. 162 Cal. App. 3d 600, 208 Cal. Rptr. 899 (1984).
211. Andalon, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 904-05.
212. 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958). In Biakanja, the issue was whether a defendant
would be liable for negligently inflicted economic loss to an injured third party not in privity of
contract with the defendant. The court found a duty to the plaintiff on policy grounds by
balancing various factors, among them the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect
the plaintiff, the foreseeability of harm to him, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered
injury, the closeness of the the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury
suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, and the policy of preventing
future harm. Biakanja, 320 P.2d at 19.
213. Id.
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mother and the doctor, the doctor's actions were clearly intended to
affect the mother, and hence, duty existed.21 The father was also held
to be entitled to sue because his interests were the "end and aim" of
the contractual relationship with the doctor.215
A subsequent case, Newton v. Kaiser Hospital,216 involved facts that
presented more difficult duty issues. Parents of a baby who suffered
injury during delivery brought suit against the doctor who delivered
the baby for their emotional harm. On the basis of Andalon, the court
recognized the existence of a duty to both parents. As in Andalon, the
court placed great emphasis on the existence of a doctor-patient rela-
tionship, and from that relationship, argued that the contract for serv-
ices was clearly intended to benefit both parents.217
Taken together, Andalon and Newton suggest that the existence of a
contractual relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant may
suffice to create a duty to avoid negligent infliction of emotional harm.
The two cases also suggest that a doctor-patient relationship is
intended to benefit non-patients, at least insofar as those non-patients
are in contractual privity with the doctor. If other courts similarly
balance the issues, many negligence actions that now involve only one
plaintiff may give rise to two or more additional claims. Slight varia-
tions in balancing could lead to even more extensive liability.
Because policy-balancing makes the determination of the duty ele-
ment inherently more open-ended, it poses unique challenges in the
context of intangible injuries.21 8 If courts choose to reintegrate direct
victim actions for emotional distress into the fabric of ordinary duty
issues, they must decide how they will treat policy-balancing and when
they will use it. One option would be to reject policy-balancing as a
basis for finding duty in cases in which the harm suffered is purely
emotional. The majority in Marlene F., for example, described the
bases for finding duty very narrowly, without including policy-balanc-
ing. However, if policy-balancing is well-accepted as a means of deter-
mining duty in a particular jurisdiction, as is the case in California,
courts may prefer simply to provide firm guidance for use of this
means of determining the existence of duty. In the context of actions
for negligently inflicted economic harm, an area in which concern
regarding disproportionality of fault and liability is equally pervasive,
214. Andalon, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 965.
215. Id.
216. 184 Cal. App. 3d 386, 228 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1986).
217. Newton, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 894.
218. In essence, it combines an open-ended manner of analysis with a type of harm that in
some instances poses a risk of widespread liability.
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courts continue to use policy-balancing as a means of determining the
existence of duty.2
19
Perhaps the best resolution of this dilemma is to make policy-bal-
ancing available, but to use it sparingly. In general, the rules gov-
erning duty in actions involving traditional personal injury or property
damage will identify cases in which recovery for pure emotional harm
poses no danger of disproportionality between liability and fault. In a
case like Andalon, for example, the existence of a doctor-patient rela-
tionship between the doctor and the parents for the purpose of genetic
counseling suggests the fairness of recognition of the parents' claim.
The doctor agreed to assist the parents with genetic counseling and, as
a result of the professional relationship, the parents relied and
depended upon his expertise. Policy-balancing should not be neces-
sary as a basis for determining the existence of duty in such cases. In
cases like Newton, involving parental distress during delivery of an
infant, recognition of a duty to avoid emotional distress would signal
inclusion of collateral plaintiffs and cause courts to perceive a risk of
disproportionate liability.220
Courts dealing with these cases should evaluate them closely in this
regard. In some instances, they may find that duty can be recognized
without resort to policy-balancing and without posing any risk of
unfairness to the defendant by disproportionality between fault and
liability. For example, courts may find a duty exists to the mother of a
child injured at delivery because care of a baby prior to, during, and
shortly after birth may equate to care of the mother.221 While difficult
lines remain to be drawn,222 resolution of cases like the prototypical
219. See, eg., J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 24 Cal. 3d 799, 598 P.2d 60, 157 Cal. Rptr. 407
(1979). Professor Rabin argues that courts are inconsistent in their treatment of negligently
inflicted economic loss. In cases in which the economic loss is suffered in conjunction with
physical damage, courts may attribute no significance to the characer of the loss. Hence, the
balancing approach originated in Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958), is not
uniformly applied. Rabin, supra note 35, at 1514-21.
220. Courts may fear that if recovery is permitted, all parents and family members will bring
suit every time a relative is injured as a result of medical malpractice.
221. This point is acknowledged by some courts. See, eg., Ramos v. Valley Vista Hosp., 189
Cal. App. 3d 985, 234 Cal. Rptr. 608, 611 n.4 (1987) ("In any case, delivery, the separation of the
child from the mother, cannot be accomplished without rendering care and treatment to the
mother. The mother is the direct victim of negligent prenatal care or delivery."). The court in
Ramos believed that duty extended to the father as a direct benefiz-iary of the doctor-patient
relationship between the mother and the physician. Id.
222. There will still be cases in which the courts are forced to draw the line between care of
child and care of the mother. See, eg., Johnson v. Jamaica Hosp., 62 N.Y.2d 523, 467 N.E.2d
502, 478 N.Y.S.2d 838 (1984). In Johnson, a newborn child whose mother had been discharged,
was kidnapped from a hospital eight days after birth. The court held that there was no direct
duty to the parents and that the parents had not pleaded they were in the zone of danger. See
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case presented will be much more concrete and will stand on firm ana-
lytical ground.
In cases in which none of the duty principles discussed would indi-
cate the existence of a duty in tort,22 3 balancing is inevitable if courts
wish to retain the flexibility to find that a duty exists in unique circum-
stances. Courts must then consider seriously the criteria upon which
they rely to establish the existence of a duty in tort and the weight
afforded each consideration. Whereas foreseeability of harm to the
plaintiff may be important in landowner/occupier cases, it should not
be weighted heavily in cases in which the type of harm suffered poses a
danger of disproportionate liability.224 Further, contractual relation-
ships as indicators of the validity of a duty in tort should not be given
the emphasis they were accorded in Andalon and Newton. 225 Finally,
if courts decide to engage in policy-balancing, they must survey the
policy considerations surrounding other related causes of action, such
as bystander claims, loss of consortium or wrongful birth claims, as
well as actions for wrongful death.226 By doing so, they can work to
achieve a cohesive policy regarding the desirability of recovery for cer-
tain types of intangible loss instead of a patch-work of rulings on indi-
vidual causes of action.
also Kalina v. General Hosp., 13 N.Y.2d 1023, 195 N.E.2d 309, 245 N.Y.S.2d 599 (1963) (no
duty was owed to parents who suffered emotional distress when their newborn son was
circumcised by a doctor in violation of clear instructions that he was to be circumcised in
accordance with their religion).
223. See, eg., Budavari v. Barry, 176 Cal. App. 3d 849, 222 Cal. Rptr. 446 (1986). A wife
brought an action against both the physicians and the hospital for emotional distress suffered as a
result of the physicians' alleged negligent failure to inform her husband of a possible lesion on his
lung. The court held that no duty was owed, because the wife was neither a bystander nor a
direct victim. The court's analysis of the direct victim issue is quite unsatisfactory, however, in
that it relies on a distinction between incorrect communication of a diagnosis to a family member
(which presumably would give rise to a cause of action for emotional distress), and failure to
diagnose, which would not. Budavar, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 449.
224. See Rabin, supra note 35, at 1522-27 (explaining that foreseeability provides virtually no
meaningful limits on liability for intangible injuries such as pure emotional harm).
225. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 20, § 54 ("Tort obligations are in general obligations
that are imposed by law-apart from and independent of promises made and therefore apart
from the manifested intention of the parties-to avoid injury to others."). While duty in tort is
independent of contract, the existence of contractual privity may be a factor indicative of a
relationship between the parties which, together with other policy considerations, might suggest
that a duty in tort be recognized. M. FRANKLIN & R. RABIN, supra note 67, at 139 n.5.
226. For example, in Budavari v. Barry, 176 Cal. App. 3d 849, 222 Cal. Rptr. 446, 449
(1986), the court viewed the spouse's claim for emotional distress as essentially a claim for grief
and sorrow precluded by California's action for wrongful death.
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C. Requiring Proof of Serious Injury
Prior sections of this Article have described and evaluated the
requirement that emotional distress manifest itself through "serious
and genuine injury" or "physical manifestations. 227 Courts impose
these requirements because of a desire to reduce the likelihood of
fraudulent or trivial claims.228 This subsection addresses the question
of whether these injury-related requirements should be maintained if
direct actions for emotional distress are evaluated under the duty rules
governing ordinary personal injury and property damage.
The strongest argument in favor of maintaining some injury-related
requirement is that pure emotional distress damages are intangible
enough that some additional safeguard against trivial or fraudulent
claims will always be required, regardless of the duty rules that apply.
The duty rules discussed in Marlene F.- special relationships, under-
takings to act, and obligations imposed by law-as well as the other
duty principles identified,229 can impose meaningful limitations on
recovery of damages for pure emotional distress because such rules
represent rational and fair choices regarding accountability for negli-
gence and minimize inclusion of collateral plaintiffs.
Despite these virtues, however, none of the Marlene F. duty rules
would have an impact, positive or negative, on the goal of preventing
litigation of trivial or fraudulent claims. Suppose, for example, that a
doctor negligently overschedules surgery, necessitaiting postponement
of plaintiff's elective surgery. Plaintiff is agitated, disappointed, incon-
venienced, and desires to bring an action for damages. While the
existence of a doctor/patient relationship may explain the fairness of
holding a defendant accountable for negligence and ensure that liabil-
ity will not extend to innumerable plaintiffs collateral to the defendant,
the relationship does not enhance the genuineness or magnitude of the
claim. While it is true that a plaintiff who suffered some minor per-
sonal injury during the course of surgery would be permitted to sue
based on the mere allegation of a relationship with the doctor, there is
a legitimate question whether pure emotional distress damages ought
to be actionable on the same basis.
Emotional distress is sufficiently intangible that trivial or fraudulent
claims will remain a legitimate concern.230 Thus, even if direct actions
227. See supra text accompanying notes 64-68 and notes 115-20.
228. See supra text accompanying notes 64-65 and note 120.
229. See supra text accompanying notes 157-89.
230. Weighing the costs and benefits of permitting such claims, I believe the costs far
outweigh the benefits. The costs of adjudicating and settling trivial claims of all types already
require a significant commitment of societal resources.
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are reintegrated into the body of tort law, the requirement of pleading
some threshold level of injury is appropriate.231 Although neither the
serious and genuine injury nor the physical manifestations rule is per-
fect,232 both rules provide some check on the inclination of potential
plaintiffs to convert minor emotional blows into lawsuits.233
D. An Assessment
This subsection evaluates whether the change in approach suggested
by the California Supreme Court's analysis in Marlene F. constitutes
an improvement over either the foreseeability-plus-serious-injury or
the zone-of-danger rules. Prior sections of this Article have evaluated
the existing rules in light of several criteria, including administrative
feasibility as well as propriety, or fairness, of limits imposed.2 34 This
subsection evaluates the approach suggested by Marlene F in light of
these criteria and other important issues of tort policy.
The two primary policy issues motivating courts to limit recovery
for damages caused by negligently inflicted emotional distress are fear
that liability will be "disproportionate" to fault and that trivial or
fraudulent claims will be encouraged.2 35 A pure foreseeability rule is
unresponsive to the first concern because it will extend duty infinitely
if applied literally. If not applied literally, a pure foreseeability rule is
incapable of providing principled guidelines. The duty rules utilized
by the California Supreme Court in Marlene F., even if supplemented
by other rules discussed above,236 virtually eliminate disproportionate
liability because they limit actions by plaintiffs who suffer in some col-
lateral way from a defendant's negligence.237 Once this threat of lia-
bility to every person affected by a defendant's negligence is removed,
direct actions can be reintegrated with tort duty issues.238
231. The question of whether similar requirements ought to be imposed in other instances
where recovery is sought for intangible injury, such as pain and suffering, is beyond the scope of
this Article.
232. See supra notes 115-20.
233. For reasons discussed more fully in prior sections, I would favor adoption of a serious
and genuine injury requirement. This rule seems highly unlikely to discourage legitimate claims,
but, at the same time, useful in giving judges a basis for pre-screening the injuries presented in
complaints. For a general discussion of the two rules, see supra text accompanying notes 64-68
and notes 115-20.
234. See supra text accompanying notes 97-114.
235. See supra text accompanying notes 72-79.
236. See supra text accompanying notes 203-26.
237. See supra text accompanying notes 186-89.
238. To some extent, this reintegration will be incomplete if there is a requirement that the
plaintiff be able to plead serious injury. In ordinary negligence actions, a plaintiff must prove
that he or she suffered some personal injury or property damage. Nominal damages are not
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By basing duty on criteria other than, or in addition to, general fore-
seeability of harm to the plaintiffs, the Marlene F. approach does leave
certain persons who may foreseeably suffer emotional harm without a
negligence claim. For example, it is quite clear that parents
foreseeably affected by a doctor's malpractice on a child would not be
permitted to bring suit.2 39 This non-recovery, of course, is hardly
unique to the actions for emotional distress,2" but nontheless poses
the toughest challenge to fairness of any limited duty approach. At
least in this particular context, however, there is rio way to maintain
some proportionality of liability and at the same time allow all foresee-
able plaintiffs to recovery. Therefore, making decisions about action-
ability based on the fairness of holding the defendant accountable is
sensible.
The zone-of-danger rule, of course, also limits lawsuits by collateral
plaintiffs. In addition, the rigidity of the rule makes it fairly easy for
courts to apply. The approach suggested by Marlene F., although
based on concrete rules that are also generally easy to apply, includes
room for ambiguity, particularly if a court accepts policy-balancing as
a basis for determining duty in some cases. Even if the approach out-
lined by the California Supreme Court in Marlene F is slightly more
difficult to apply than the zone-of-danger rule, it merits serious consid-
eration because the basis for recognizing duty is raore fair and more
meaningful than bare reliance on presence in a zone of physical dan-
ger. This is not to suggest that the zone of danger rule, by requiring
presence in the zone of physical harm as a pre-requisite to recovery of
damages for emotional distress, is unfair. Rather, it is underinclusive,
and hence appears unfair in excluding claims grounded on other legiti-
mate bases. By accepting the actionability of emotional distress dam-
ages in a broader range of situations-including special relationships
and undertakings to act--courts can more fully recognize that many
types of interactions between plaintiffs and defendants are equally suit-
recoverable. C. MORRIS & C.R. MORRIS, MORRIS ON TORTS 44 (1980). However, the plaintiff
does not need to establish a threshold level of harm to make the claim actionable.
239. A recent California appellate case applying Marlene F reaches this conclusion. Schwarz
v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 226 Cal. App. 3d 149, 276 Cal. Rptr. 470 (1990) (father who
participated in meetings with child's therapist, agreed to participate in individual therapy with
another therapist, and paid for child's therapy held not to be a direct victim under Marlene F.).
240. Indeed, the whole purpose of duty rules is to select the cases that ought to be permitted
to go forward. See supra text accompanying notes 176-85. Many commentators have urged the
replacement of the tort system with a social compensation system. See, ag., Sugarmen, Doing
Away with Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 558 (1985); Pierce, Encouraging Safety: The Limits of Tort
Law and Government Regulation, 33 VAND. L. REv. 1281 (1980). Even where one adopts a no-
fault system, however, choices must be made about what types of injuries to compensate. See
Abel, supra note 21, at 822-25.
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able for awards of emotional distress damages. This expansion of the
bases for recovery of damages can be achieved without triggering
potentially limitless liability, and hence is not unfair to defendants.
Having focused on the ways by which the approach suggested by
Marlene F. compares with the other competing rules, it is appropriate
to consider other policy issues raised by the approach. One drawback
of both the prevailing rules and the Marlene F. approach is that duty
decisions entail litigation. Thus, even if the rules are relatively con-
crete, societal resources of all types will be channeled into testing the
actionability of particular cases. This is obviously more labor- and
litigation-intensive than the Miller/Ingber/Diamond proposal, which
would obviate all litigation over duty and, in the process, deter claims
where out-of-pocket loss is not large enough to merit litigation.24 As
noted above, there is much to commend these scholars' ideas, but their
ideas should be effectuated only in the context of a comprehensive leg-
islative revision of tort law.242 Pending such a reassessment of soci-
ety's needs, the Marlene F approach arguably promotes both fairness
and tangibility.
Another potentially disturbing aspect of the approach suggested by
Marlene F is that reliance on concrete and structured duty rules
makes the law static and unlikely to be responsive. In part, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court may have intended these characteristics, at least
in the sense that the rules are less open-ended than a pure foreseeabil-
ity rule. On the other hand," there is clearly immense latitude in what
constitutes a special relationship or undertaking to act. In addition,
courts may choose to expand the bases for duty as tort law evolves.243
Ultimately, changing values and the pressures of new factual scena-
rios will push courts to confront the policy issues that continue to arise
in cases involving negligent infliction of emotional distress. If courts'
concerns regarding disproportionate liability and the presentation of
trivial or fraudulent claims are assuaged by use of the concrete rules
suggested by Marlene F, it is possible that they will be willing to
address other policy issues more openly.
One further objection to the California Supreme Court's approach
in Marlene F is that it purports to reintegrate direct actions into ordi-
nary negligence actions in most respects, but does not address the sta-
241. See supra text accompanying notes 123-50.
242. See supra text accompanying notes 146-50.
243. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A comment b (1985) (the special
relationships enumerated as giving rise to a duty to aid or rescue not intended to be exclusive);
see also Farwell v. Keaton, 396 Mich. 281, 240 N.W.2d 217 (1976) (special relationship between
companions on social ventures).
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tus of bystander claims. This ambiguity is particularly distressing in
light of the confusion that courts have experienced in distinguishing
between direct and bystander actions.244 The tenor of the Marlene F.
opinion and the specificity and narrowness of the duty rules utilized
indicate that if all emotional distress claims were iewed as ordinary
negligence actions, bystander claims as they exist today would virtu-
ally disappear. In the typical bystander case, where, for example, a
parent witnesses injury to a child, there is rarely any basis for sug-
gesting that the defendant owed a duty, as defined by the court, to the
parent. 2
45
Given the difficulty of synthesizing bystander recovery with the
rules articulated in Marlene F., the likely result is that courts that
believe in the justice of recognizing some percipient witness claims will
continue to do so, even if they cannot be analyzed as ordinary negli-
gence claims. While the existence of these islands of bystander claims
requiring special rules is analytically unsatisfying, it will not be partic-
ularly problematic to the attorneys and judges utilizing the rules.
Because the decision in Marlene F. provides a clear rationale for
selecting which claims for damage resulting from emotional harm are
actionable, courts choosing to distinguish between direct and
bystander claims should have less difficulty in doing so.
V. CONCLUSION
Negligence actions for damages arising from emotional harm con-
sistently have challenged the legal system. Neitheir the pure foresee-
ability-plus-serious-injury rule nor the zone-of-danger rule has
achieved a completely satisfactory balance between competing policy
considerations. The pure foreseeability-plus-serious-injury rule, if
applied literally, is incapable of placing any limits on the number of
lawsuits that a defendant's negligence may engender. If not applied
literally, the rule provides no principled guidelines regarding selection
244. See supra text accompanying notes 38-51.
245. There might be such a basis as, for example, the parent's own presence in the zone of
danger, but this is often not the case. Special relationships and undertakings to act appear even
more rare in the bystander scenario. However, Professors Chamallas and Kerber suggest that
the parental relationship often existing between a bystander parent and an injured child
constitutes a relational interest entitled to great weight. They contend that de-emphasis of this
relationship evidences a world view that excludes the physical and social experiences of
motherhood. Chamallas & Kerber, supra note 29, at 858-64. While most courts would probably
agree that the emotional attachment between parent and child is an extraordinarily strong bond,
it is doubtful that they would recognize this relationship alone as the basis for finding a legal duty
to the bystander parent. To do so would be to recognize the viability of parental claims in all
instances when a child has been injured as a result of a defendant's negligence.
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of the class of plaintiffs permitted to bring suit. The zone-of-danger
rule, while imposing firm limitations on lawsuits, is often applied more
narrowly and rigidly than its underlying policy justifications suggest,
thereby resulting in a denial of compensation in cases in which recov-
ery could and should be permitted.
The California Supreme Court's opinion in Marlene F., while not a
panacea for the problems presented by intangible injury, suggests that
an intermediate approach may be feasible. By expanding the criteria
that allow for an actionable claim for damages beyond creation of a
risk of physical harm, California and other state courts may recognize
that many types of interactions between defendants and plaintiffs are
equally legitimate bases for awards of damages that stem from emo-
tional harm. At the same time, by reducing the role of foreseeability
as a determinant of duty, courts will be assured that the intangible
character of the injury will not produce unlimited liability on the part
of defendants-a fairness concern that has long dominated judicial
opinions.
